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Zusammenfassung 
 
Diese Dissertation beschäftigt sich mit Kausalkognition bei nich tmenschlichen Primaten. Es 
wurden drei experim entelle Paradigm en verw endet, um  zu beleuchten, wie Menschenaffen 
physische Beziehungen zwischen Objekten verstehen.  
In der ersten Studie ( STUDIE I) wurden Schim pansen, Gorillas, Orang-Utans und Kinder m it 
einem Problem  konfrontiert, dessen Lösung die Verwendung eines f lüssigen Werkzeugs 
(Wasser) erforderte. Einige der Schim pansen und Kinder entdeckten „einsichtsvoll“ eine 
Lösung, um an eine Belohnung (Erdnuss) zu gela ngen, die sich außerh alb ihrer Reichweite 
befand. Verschiedene Kontrollbedingungen unt ermauerten die Zielgerichtetheit des 
Verhaltens der Schimpansen. Die getesteten Go rillas und die Orang-Utans waren nicht in der 
Lage, die Aufgabe zu lösen.  
Zwei weitere Studien widm eten sich der Frage, ob Schim pansen Gewicht als kausal 
relevantes Unterscheidungs-m erkmal nutzen können. In STUDIE II  war es Aufgabe der 
Schimpansen aus insgesam t fünf in Form  und Größe identischen F laschen diejenige zu 
finden, die als einzige Fruchtsaft enthielt. Die Saftflasche untersch ied sich dabei entweder 
durch ihr Gewicht (kausales Merkmal) oder durch ih re Farbmarkierung (arbiträres Merkmal) 
von den anderen Flaschen. Es zeigte sich, dass das Suchverhalten der Testtiere stark von der  
Art des jew eiligen Me rkmals beein flusst wa r. Während Schim pansen schnell lernten, die 
Saftflasche aufgrund ihres kausal relevanten Merkmals zu identifizieren, gelang ihnen dies 
nicht anhan d des arbiträren Hinweisreiz es. STUDIE II I fokussierte noch detaillierter auf die  
Unterscheidung zwischen Ereignisketten, die entweder in arbiträrem  oder kausalem 
Zusammenhang standen. Die Schimpansen ware n hier aufgefordert, durch rein passives 
Beobachten den Aufenthaltsort einer Futterbelohnung (Banane) herauszufinden. Dazu wurden 
zwei verschiedene Ereignisfolgen präsentiert: eine kausal informative Abfolge (hervorgerufen 
durch die physische Wirkung des Futters) und eine  rein arbiträre Abfolge (hervorgerufen 
durch ein Ereignis, dass in ke inerlei kausalem Zusammenhang zum Futter stand). Auch hier 
waren Schimpansen nur dann erf olgreich, w enn die Testsituation ka usale Rückschlüsse 
ermöglichte, während es ihnen anderseits nich t gelang, nützliche Schlussfolgerungen aus rein 
arbiträren Zusammenhängen zu ziehen. Beme rkenswerterweise unterschied en die Tiere 
offensichtlich zwischen zwei Testsituationen,  die perz eptuell nahezu  id entisch, kon zeptuell 
jedoch sehr verschieden waren.  
Zusammenfassend lassen sich d ie Daten dahingehend interpreti eren, dass – ähn lich wie bei 
Menschen – die kausale Kognition bei Schim pansen nicht nur auf rein perzeptuellen 
Informationen, sondern zudem  auf strukturel len Abstraktionen ihre r physischen Um gebung 
beruht. Es wird allerdings verm utet, dass Menschen als einzige Art in der Lage sind, darüber 
hinaus rein symbolische Informationen zu konzeptualisieren.  
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Summary 
 
This thesis focused on the topic of causal cognition in nonhuman primates. For that purpose, I 
applied three experimental paradigms to test different aspects of gr eat apes’ understanding of 
physical object–object relations.  
In the first study ( STUDY I ), chimpanzees, go rillas, orang utans, and hum an children were 
confronted with a problem  that required the u se of a liquid  tool in o rder to access a reward  
(peanut). Without any training, some chim panzees and human children found the solution in  
an insightful way. Several control conditions confirmed the goal directedness of chimpanzees’ 
behavior. None of the tested gorilla and orangutan subjects were successful.  
The next two studies ad dressed chimpanzees’ noti on of weight as a caus ally relevant object 
property. In STUDY II, chimpanzees were required to detect a bottle containing juice from five 
opaque bottles of equal shape and size. The bottl e of juice differed either by weight (causal 
property) or by color (a rbitrary property) from the other bottles. It turn ed out that subjects’ 
searching behavior was strongl y influenced by the nature of the provided inform ation. 
Although chimpanzees readily inferred the bottle of  juice from its causally relevan t property, 
they did not learn to use the arbitrary cue during the course of the experiment.  
STUDY III focused in more detail on the discrepancy be tween stimulus relations that are either 
arbitrarily or causally connected. C himpanzees had to infer the location of a reward (banana) 
by passively watching an external procedure. Two kinds of event sequences were presented: a 
causally inform ative sequence (derived from the physical effect of the reward) and a  
completely arbitrary sequence (d erived from  an action u nrelated to the r eward). Again,  
chimpanzees performed more correctly when th e situation allowed for causal judg ments but  
failed to make useful inferences when the underlying logic was ar bitrary. Rem arkably, 
subjects appreciated the conceptual difference between these two experimental conditions that 
were perceptually very similar. 
Taking together all of the current d ata, I s uggest that—similar to in humans—chimpanzees’ 
causal cognition is based not only on perceptual infor mation but also on structural abstraction 
about their physical environment. However, I speculate that humans might be the only species 
that is also able to conceptualize purely symbolic information.  
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GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
 
 “…no truth appears to me more evident, than  that beasts are endow ed with thought and 
reason as well as men. The arguments are in this  case so obvious, that they never escape the 
most stupid and ignorant.” 
 
David Hume  
Of the Reason of Ani mals (From A Treatise o f Human 
Nature)  
 
 
Prologue 
 
When I recently ask ed the five -year-old daughter of a friend if she had taken the last cookie 
from the tab le, she readily to ld me why she had done so, referring to her trem endous hunger 
and her father’s perm ission. Interestingly, even  though m y original que stion only sought an 
answer to w hether or not som ething had happe ned, it som ehow seemed evident to he r that I 
was actually interested in the reason behind or the cause for her behavior . W hat this little 
anecdote illustrates is an intriguing quality of human cognition. We humans obviously have a 
natural propensity to organize the physical (a nd psychological) environm ent around us into 
cause–effect structures. Such structuring allows us to understand the world in a way that goes 
beyond m ere probabilistic pred ictions and facilitates more accurate or app ropriate 
expectations. An exciting conundrum  of com parative psychology is whether or not we share 
this cognitive peculiarity to some degree with other (closely related) species.  
 
Like many other areas of scientif ic research, the interest in causality h as its roo ts in ancient 
philosophy. After the antiquity, David Hum e was one of the m ost influential thinkers to 
explore this issue. When he famously claimed that “cause and effect” is a m an-made concept 
with purely perceptual repetitions underl ying the process of association (Hume , 
1740/1739/1986), his radical stance  challenged not only other phi losophers but also general 
common se nse. Many others have disputed hi s purely em piricist account of causality (e.g.,  
(Kant, 1787/1986; Mackie, 1980; Michotte, 1 963; Mill, 1843/1979), a nd a lively on-going 
debate continues to inspire scientific thinking.  
Before delineating the psychological relevance of the topic addressed by this thesis, I would 
like to cla rify explic itly what this  work is  not about. Given the em pirical character of this 
thesis, its pr imary intention canno t be a conceptual clarification of the nature of causation as 
such—in an ontological or epistem ological se nse. In contrast to m ost philosophical 
approaches and in order to ge nerate testable empirical hypot heses, a pragm atic notion of 
causality un derlies th is thesis.  That is, a causal re lation b etween two  events A a nd B is 
characterized by a spatial and tem poral contingency in which A not only preced es B, but A 
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(the cause) also necessarily produces  the appearance of B (the effect). Furtherm ore, it is  
assumed that a purely post hoc sequence of two events (B after A) is co nceptually different 
from a propter hoc sequence (B because of  A), with only the latter representing an inherent 
causal structure.  
 
 
General approach 
 
This thesis deals with the c ognitive abilities of nonhum ans. In the not too distant past, the 
term animal cognition was taboo in scientific psychol ogy. Meanwhile, it has becom e broadly 
accepted that humans share mental processes with other animals, and the central questions are 
which cognitive processes we have in comm on and to what degree they reflect the sam e 
underlying mechanisms. It has been generally claimed that the overall function of cognition is 
to give org anisms some control over their e nvironment (Sperber, 1995). Causal cogn ition in 
particular allows individuals to predict and c ontrol events in the worl d that would otherwise 
be im possible to track (Call & Tom asello, 2005; Seed & Call, in press; Waldm ann, 
Hagmayer, & Blaisdell, 2006). Species living in a com plex and changing environm ent—like 
primates—should particularly be nefit evolutionarily from m aking causal inferences in an 
uncertain universe (Rumbaugh, Beran, & Hi lix, 2000). But what differentiates causal 
inferences conceptually from the mere generation of predictions? Vi salberghi and Tomasello 
(1998, p. 189) argued th at “understanding causality  requires the organ ism to unders tand not 
just that two  events are associated with one a nother in space and tim e, but also th at there is 
some ‘mediating force’ that binds the two events to one another which may be used to predict 
or control those events.” They postulated four possible manifestations of causal reasoning that 
were defined as follows:  
 
Comprehension is assumed when an organism  understands “that an antecede nt event leads to 
a consequent event via the op eration of some m ediating fo rces that connects them —the 
mediating forces constituting the how and why of the antecedent-consequent relation.”  
Prediction is assum ed “when the organism  observes the anteced ent event only , but is  
nevertheless able to predict th e consequent event due to its producing the m ediating forces  
that should lead to the consequent.”  
Postdiction is assum ed “when the organism  observe s the consequent ev ent only, but is 
nevertheless able to infer backward in tim e to the antecedent, again via the operation of some 
mediating process that connects the two events causally.” 
Production “refers to th ose cases in  which the organi sm active ly intervenes in s ituations to 
produce or block an antecedent event and /or m ediating process so that the effect is under its 
active control.” 
According to the authors, it is especially th e last three aspects—pr ediction, postdiction, and 
production—that indicate the strongest evidence for causal understanding (Visalberghi & 
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Tomasello, 1998). The m ain goal of this thesis is  to transform this theoretical categorization 
into em pirical questions to discover whether any of these three cruc ial aspects of causal 
understanding can be found in great apes, prim arily in chimpanzees. I have tried to highlight 
the various aspects of causal  cognition by using different e xperimental paradigms—thereby 
generally focusing on the understa nding of physical object–object relations. This thesis might 
add one more piece to the complex puzzle of primate causal understanding   
Nonetheless, it should be pointed out that this enterprise is not unproblem atic, given that in 
animal cognitiv e res earch, cogni tive abilities can only be inferred fro m observed behavior 
(Lund, 2002; Shettleworth, 1998, 2001). Indeed, som e scientists have high lighted a potential 
flaw in attributing sim ilar mechanisms to si milar behavior (Povinelli, B ering, & Giam brone, 
2000; Povinelli & Vonk, 2004; W ynne & Bolhui s, 2008), whereas others have em phasized 
that studying the cognitive m echanisms of such  closely related species (as hum ans and apes) 
could serve as a useful mode l to identify precursors of our  own cognition (Berm udez, 2003; 
Rumbaugh, et al., 2000; Tom asello & Call, 1997) . This thesis follows the latter view, 
motivated b y the assu mption that species sh aring a long evolutionary history m ight have 
developed similar cognitive featur es (albeit with poten tially different levels of com plexity). 
Furthermore, given that ape cognition seem s distinct from that of other nonhum an primates 
(Visalberghi, 1997) as well as from that of humans (Tomasello, 2000), it might offer “the best 
platform from which human cognition evolved” (Russon & Begun, 2004; p. ix). 
 
Before intro ducing the specif ic stu dies of  this  thes is, I w ill br iefly o utline som e relevant 
human infa nt research as well as previous em pirical work on animals, in particular on 
primates. It is im portant to note that m ost of the studies (especia lly those conducted with 
children) do  not explic itly cla im to deal with causality as th eir cen tral topic. Nevertheless , 
given their specific focus on aspects of physic al cognition such as solidity, containm ent, 
connectedness, or continuity, they add im portant contributions to the to pic of infants’ causal 
understanding and therefore deserve mention.   
 
 
Causal cognition in children 
 
Few would disagree that hum an language is som ething very unique, and there is an old and 
ongoing scientific debate over the extent to whic h it influences or shapes our cognition (e.g., 
Bermudez, 2003; Pink er, 1997 ; W ittgenstein, 1922/2003 ). One way  to g et aro und this 
predicament is to study  children’s cognitive ab ilities before the onset  of language, and the 
methods that developmental psychologists have developed for studying preverbal infants have 
provided fruitful paradigms for investigating (nonverbal) animal cognition. 
According to Piaget’s classical v iew, object permanence—the child’s repres entation of the 
constant existence of physic al objects—m arks in a sense the foundation of  causal 
understanding in hum ans (Piaget,  1954). Stepwise developm ent over the first 18 months of 
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life allows a dive rsification f rom simply repre senting that an objec t e xists to repr esenting 
certain object properties or representing how an object interacts with others. Piaget highlights 
the importance of personal (bodily) experience fo r conceptualizing gene ral causal principles. 
Causal understanding, he claim ed, starts by infants experien cing them selves as operating 
agents (Piaget, 1930). F ollowing this assumption, others concluded that an  infant’s notion of 
causal force derives fro m perceptual analys is of m otion between two objects com bined with 
“bodily experiences of  pushing against re sistance and being pushed" (Mandler, 2004). 
According to Piaget, ch ildren transfer their bas ic notions of causality to a verbal level at the 
end of the sensory-m otor period of their inte llectual development (Piaget, 1952); only m uch 
later in ontogeny—after a long gradual process of "objectivization"—do they finally reach the 
level of “true causality” (Pia get, 1954). Others have objec ted that by treating physical 
causality as  the o rigin of  all f orms of  causa lity, Piage t ig nored th e d omain-specificity of  
causal learning (Inagaki & Hatano, 2002).  
Furthermore, in contrast to Piaget’s claim  of a prolonged, stepwise , and experience-based 
development, others have emphasized the mismatch between potential cognitive capacities on 
the one hand and (poor) m otor competence of  young infants on the other (Baillargeon, 1987; 
Carey, 1988; Leslie, 1982; Spel ke, Breinlinger, Macom ber, & Jacobson, 1992). T asks that 
require active m anipulation, so the argum ent, spur iously underrate inf ants’ actual cognitive 
competence. Instead, the analysis of looking beha vior offers a unique op portunity to evaluate 
aspects of  inf ants’ cog nition despite th eir ver y lim ited motor skills  (Fantz,  19 61). The  
underlying idea is that infants express their surprise at une xpected events through extended 
looking times or dishabituation.  
One of the first developm ental psychologists to  argue that young children exhibit an innate 
sense of physical regularities was Leslie. Dr awing on Michotte’s paradigm  of i mpulse 
transmission (Michotte, 1963), Lesl ie designed a num ber of expe riments that demonstrated a 
notion of causality in infants only a few weeks old (Leslie, 1982; Leslie & Keeble, 1987). He 
concluded that from  bi rth, hum an’s reasoning about the forces and m echanical relations 
between objects is guided by a notion of agency.  
Following this line of research, further studies  of preverbal children have supported the view 
that even very young infants understand the basic physical principles of their environm ent. 
Using an expectancy violation paradigm, several researchers found that infants appreciate the 
notion that objects can only inte ract causally when they are in physical contact (Hespos & 
Baillargeon, 2001; Spelke, 1990).  Spelke an d co lleagues postulated  that som e kinds of 
knowledge about physical regularities do not rely  on experience, whereas others do (Spelke, 
1990, 1994). Instead of repeated experi ence, innate concepts—so-called core beliefs—readily 
enable infants to expect certain  patterns in their phys ical environment (e.g., that objects move 
along connected unobstructed paths). Noncore belie fs, on the other hand, need to be acquired 
through observations and manipulations of objects (e.g., that objects require support to remain 
stable). Therefore, core beliefs can be dem onstrated earlier in ontoge ny than noncore beliefs  
(Spelke, Phillips, & Woodward, 1995).  
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Even though Baillargeo n also focused on innate aspects of hum an cognition, she rejects the 
view that infants are born with general beliefs about obj ects (Baillargeon, 2004b). Based on 
her experiments conducted with infants only a few months old, she argues that children are 
equipped with a set of innate principles about the interactions between objects and therefore 
the learn ing m echanisms them selves that gui de infants’ knowledge  acquisition are highly 
constrained. One of her exam ples of an innate  learn ing m echanism is an inf ant’s intuitive 
notion of force (Baillargeon, 1995). Furtherm ore, she questions the notion of dom ain 
generality in infant causal knowledge and points out instead the sp ecificity of children’s early 
learning.  
In order to  minimize or at leas t control the in fluence of a child’s de veloping language, other 
researchers have retained nonverbal behavioral measures even when working with older and 
linguistically m ore competent children. Hood (1995), for exam ple, showed that the naïve  
theory of gravity in preschool ch ildren caused prediction failures. Subjects expected falling  
objects to move in a straight line despite the pr esence of visible physical  barriers (like tubes) 
deviating the objects’ paths.  However, this so-called gravity bias  only  appeared when the 
presented events were in accord ance with th e physical laws (objects falling down) but no t 
when they were incongruent with them (objects moving up; Hood, 1998). Such gravity biases 
could also be dem onstrated in  nonhum an prim ates such as cotton-top tam arins (Hauser, 
Williams, Kralik, & Mo skovitz, 2001; Hood, Hauser, Anderson, & Santos, 1999) an d rhesus 
macaques (Hauser, 2001). 
In summary, a growing body of empirical evid ence suggests that hum an children appreciate 
causal regularities before they are even able to  speak and form verbal concepts. Furthermore, 
because of their young age and their obvious lack  of any extensive world experience, children 
are unlikely to base their causal principles so lely on repeated perceptual input. Later in 
children's ontogeny, w hen they are already fair ly com petent verbal comm unicators, basic 
notions of causal principles seem to guide their behavior —sometimes even leading to 
astonishing mistakes (e.g., gravity bias).   
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Causal cognition in animals 
 
Over the last decades, empiri cal research addressing causal cognition in anim als has m ainly 
focused on experim ents with ra ts, in which re markable cognitiv e perf ormances have been  
demonstrated with diffe rent paradigm s (Ada ms & Dickinson, 1981; Balleine & Dickinson, 
1998; Dickinson & Shanks, 1995). Whereas the aut hors of these studies typically highlighted 
rats’ associative abilities, others have challenged this view by claiming that rats represent not 
only the temporal but also th e causal structures of their en vironment. Recently, th e research 
group around Blaisdell provided impr essive evidence for causal r easoning in rats by showing 
that they  g enerate d ifferent expectations  wh en observ ing or in tervening in certain event 
sequences (Blaisdell, S awa, Leising, & W aldmann, 2006; Leising, Wong, W aldmann, & 
Blaisdell, 2008). Interestingl y, even though the associative pa tterns were identical, rats’ 
valuation of a comm on cause strongly depend ed on whether they a ctively in tervened o r 
simply observed an antecedent event (Blaisdell, et al., 2006; Leising, et  al., 2008). T hus, rats 
seemed to encode the causal d irectionality of the stimuli, not just the tem poral contingency, 
which suggests a rudimentary form of diagnostic abilities. The authors concluded that rats not 
only understand causal directedness from  an egocentric viewpoint but that  they also generate 
causal knowledge of externally connected events.  
 
Nonetheless, reacting to certain arb itrary stimuli (e.g., a light or a tone signals the delivery of 
food) is in som e sense categor ically different from  a causal inference that is based on 
ecologically relevant cue-outcome relations (e.g., the weight of an object signals its content). 
Kummer (1995) differentiates between strong and weak causal knowledge—a distinction that 
corresponds to Premack’s notion of arbitrary and natural causal knowledge (Prem ack, 1976; 
Premack & Premack, 1995). Weak causal knowledge is a result of associative learning, which 
requires repetitive experience of num erous closely contiguous events, and the underlying 
learning mechanism is presum ably very sim ilar for m any species. Strong causal knowledge, 
in contrast, is based on an a priori interpreta tion of specific events  without the need of 
extensive exposure or a close sp atial and temporal contiguity. Such strong causal knowledge 
can be unconscious and is based on m echanisms that are highly specific to species (Kummer, 
1995). Others have suggested that causal reas oning emerges from strong causal knowledge  
but goes beyond it in the sense th at “[it] allow s flex ible responses to novel contingencies” 
(Visalberghi & Tomasello, 1998). According to Premack and Premack (1995), who employ a 
similar conc ept, natu ral causality an d arbitra ry causality are based on different underlying 
representations. Only natura l causation can  be inferred en tirely based on a single episode, 
whereas rep resentations of  arbitra ry relation s are ba sed o n m ultiple s amples of  the causa l 
process (Premack, 1976; Premack & Premack, 1995).  
I would lik e to em phasize that th e vast m ajority of anim al studies  concern ing causal 
cognition—especially those using rats as thei r subjects—have dealt with arbitrary causal 
relations in Prem ack’s term s. In contras t, a ll experiments presented in this thes is conf ront 
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subjects with problem s that hold natural causal relations—in Prem ack’s (1995) term s—and 
therefore require strong causal knowledge, to use Kummer’s (1995) terminology.  
 
Other than rats, birds are presum ably the most extensively studied nonp rimate group when it 
comes to cognitiv e abilities. Seve ral bird spec ies—especially members of the corvid f amily, 
such as New Caledonian crows and rooks—have b een tested in various experimental designs 
(Helme, Clayton, & Emery, 2006; Hunt, 1996; Seed, Tebbich, Emery, & Clayton, 2006; Weir, 
Chappell, & Kaceln ik, 2002). Such studies have  provided supporting evidence for the claim  
that sub jects not only access perceptual cu es but are also  able to extract causally relevan t 
functional information in a problem-solving context (Seed & Call, 2009). The case of rooks is 
especially remarkable because, in contrast to New Caledonian crows or chimpanzees, they are 
not known to use tools in the wild (Em ery & Clayton, 2008). Therefore, it has been argued 
that the ability to r epresent tools m ay be a domain-general cognitive capacity rather than an 
adaptive specialization (Bird & Em ery, 2009). The intriguing results of these studies 
increasingly challenge apes’ predom inance in several aspects of probl em solving, including 
causal knowledge and tool use, and raise the interesting question of  convergent cognitive 
evolution in hom inids and othe r more distan tly r elated taxa  such as birds (Chappell &  
Kacelnik, 2002; Emery & Clayton, 2004; Heinrich, 2000; Hunt, 2004).  
 
 
Causal cognition in primates 
 
Some basic notions of natural causality have been demonstrated in several m onkey species.  
Even though capuchin monkeys are the only wild pr imate tool users outside of the ape fa mily 
(Boinski, Quatrone, & Swartz, 2000; Fragaszy, Izar, Visalberghi, Ottoni, & De Oliveira, 
2004) the functional use of sim ple tools was successfully induced in other m onkey species 
under experimental conditions. It was shown for ex ample that in a sim ple tool-using context, 
cotton-top tamarins, common marmosets, vervet monkey, and lemurs pay special attention to 
the size or the shape of objects ra ther than to nonfunctional properties such as color or texture 
(Hauser, Pearson, & Seelig, 2002; Santos, Mahajan, & Barnes, 2005; Santos, Miller, & 
Hauser, 2003; Santos, P earson, Spaepen, Tsao, & Hauser, 2006; Spau lding & Hauser, 2005), 
leaving unanswered whether or not those pref erences m ight rep resent innate p erceptually 
based biases. However, cotton-top tam arins both differentiated between functional and 
nonfunctional object properties in a particular setting and also  successfully transferred only 
functionally relevant inform ation to a novel cont ext while ignoring perceptual features that 
were irrelevant to the solution (Hauser, Kr alik, & Botto-Mahan, 1999). Pigeons tested in a 
similar task failed to achieve this functional transfer, which suggests that their perfor mance 
was based on a purely perceptu al analysis of the objects (S chmidt & Cook, 2006). In another 
study, Hauser (1998) showed that  tam arins generate different  expectations concerning the 
characteristics of self-propelled and static objec ts, suggesting that they take into account why 
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objects move and what determ ines their m oving trajectory. Neverthe less, in additio n to the  
numerous positive findings, some of the aforementioned experiments as well as oth er studies 
and natural observations  show the clear lim itations of these m onkeys' c ognitive flexibility 
with respect to causal unders tanding (Cheney & Seyfarth , 1990; Hauser, 2001; Kumm er, 
1995; Visalberghi, Frag aszy, & Sav age-Rumbaugh, 1995; Visalb erghi & Lim ongelli, 1994 ; 
Zuberbühler, 2000).  
Within the primate family, chimpanzees are considered to be the most flexible tool users apart 
from hum ans (e.g., Byrne, 1995; Köhler, 1925;  Tom asello & Call, 1997). The notion of 
flexibility is important because it pin points the crucial difference between cognitively guided 
behavior and purely innate or preprogramm ed action patterns. It has be en argued as well that 
apes (e.g., chim panzees) show greater cogniti ve flexibility than m onkeys (e.g., capuchin  
monkeys) in the too l-using domain (Limongelli, Boysen, & Visalbergh i, 1995; Tho mpson & 
Oden, 2000; Visalberghi, 1997; Visalberghi, et  al., 1995). The available data suggest that 
capuchin to ol users learn to asso ciate elem ents of their own behavior with a particular 
outcome very effectiv ely. Chim panzees, on  th e other h and, appear to  have an additional 
notion of the underlying causal forces and to understand th e causal relations involved in their 
tool using (Visalberghi & Tomasello, 1998). Alongside the enormous number of experimental 
studies that have focused on various kinds of tool-using behavior, som e studies have 
concentrated m ore specifically on chim panzees’ rep resentation of hidden causes (e.g., 
Mathieu, Daudelin, Dagenais, & Décarie, 1980; Povinelli & Dunphy-Lelii, 2001).  
One of  the f irst s tudies to exp licitly f ocus on natura l causal r easoning in ch impanzees was 
conducted by Premack and Premack (1976). A female chimpanzee familiar with human tools 
was able to correctly identify the tool (e.g., a knife) that could lead from a pre-state (e.g., a 
whole apple) to a post-state version of a targ et object (two apple halves). However, their 
experiment did not rule out ot her explan ations such as asso ciative stra tegies. I n a late r 
experiment, the same authors showed that human children, from quite early in their ontogeny, 
reach a level of causal understa nding that goes beyond th at of other prim ates (Prem ack & 
Premack, 1994). Chim panzees and children saw the experimenter hide tw o kinds of food in 
two containers. After the subjects subsequently  witnessed the experim enter eat one of the 
food items, all of the children and  some of the chimpanzees chose the container with the food 
item that had not been eaten. In the followi ng condition, the tim e interval between the 
“placement event” an d the “eating event” was m ade too short for a possib le causal 
connection. Whereas the four-yea r old children changed thei r behavior immediately, younger 
children an d the chim panzees retained their in itial cho ice behavior (P remack & Prem ack, 
1994).  
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Outline studies 
 
In the first study presen ted in this thesis ( STUDY I ), we challeng ed g reat apes  an d hum an 
children with a problem analogous to one of popular folklore. In Aesop’s fables, a crow 
solved the problem of how to reach  water fr om the bottom of a pitcher by th rowing stones  
into it, thus raising the water level. Until recently there was little scientific evidence to support 
such an anecdotal claim (but see Bird & Em ery, in prep., for a related design). As m entioned 
already, som e bird and prim ate species spontan eously use tools to extract em bedded foods 
(Hunt & Gray, 2004; Tebbich & Bshary, 2004; To masello & Call, 1997), and this propensity 
has been used to investigate their causal knowledge underlying the avoidance of obstacles and 
selecting a nd m anufacturing too ls. However, in virtu ally a ll ex isting task s, reward  
accessibility is gained by transferring force from a solid tool to the reward. The first empirical 
evidence for the use of water as a tool  came from  Me ndes, Hanus, and Call' s (2007) 
experimental study with captive orangutans. Here, subjects were ab le to alter the accessibility 
of the reward (a peanut) by adding water to a closed-b ottom cylinder. The goal of  STUDY I  
was to replicate tho se findings with  two previo usly untested ape species—chim panzees and 
gorillas. Furthermore, human children of differ ent ages we re tes ted for the f irst time with a  
task involving the use of a nonsolid tool. Because subjects were required to both anticipate the 
expected interplay of the elements involved and act physically towards a desired outcome, the 
"productive aspect" of causal unders tanding (Visalberghi & Tom asello, 1998) was explicitly  
investigated here. For further details, see STUDY I: “Comparing the performance of apes and 
humans in the floating peanut task.” 
 
STUDY II  focused on the "predictiv e aspect" of causal unders tanding (Visalberghi & 
Tomasello, 1998) by investigating to what extent chim panzees exploit different kinds of 
information in a sim ulated ac tive f oraging co ntext. Subjects were provided with either an 
arbitrary color cue or a causal weig ht cue, bot h reliably ind icating the location of  a  desired 
food item. According to optimal foraging theory  (Krebs, 1977; Maca rthur & Pianka, 1966) 
mobile org anisms aim  t o m aximize their en ergy intake in  rela tion to tim e. In contras t to  
species that can proce ss their food directly th rough morphological adaptations, other anim als 
depend on  physical m anipulations—for exam ple, the crack ing of nuts—to  access the 
embedded nutrients (Seed & Call, in press). Consequently, subjects should benefit from  a  
goal-oriented rather than a random  searching be havior, because m istaken attempts are costly 
with respect to energy investment.  
We hypothesized that if chimpanzees are capable of causal inferences, they should  appreciate 
a problem -solving context with an inherent  causal logic. If, on the other hand, the 
predominant cognitive p rocess is ass ociative learning or tr ial-and-error strategies rather than 
causal reasoning, subjects’ exploring behavior s hould not be affected in the sam e way by the 
nature of the given cue. It is im portant to reiterate that in a purely statistical sense, both kinds 
of cues (arbitrary and causal) provide exactly the same predictive value for the location of the 
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desired food item . The analysis of subjects’ s earching behavior m ight therefore illum inate 
important aspects of their informatio n processing. For fu rther details, see STUDY I I: 
“Contrasting the use of causal and arbitrary cues in chimpanzee problem solving.” 
 
Under natu ral cond itions, situations  with a  cau sal structure usually dif fer in m any respects 
from those with a purely spatial and tem poral relation. It is therefore im portant to isolate 
crucial factors that might differentiate between events that are purely correlated and those that 
also hold a causal relationship. One promising way of doing so is to present situations that are 
perceptually very sim ilar yet dif fer crucially in their concep tual content.  In other words, if 
subjects represent cause–effect relations about their external world di fferently from  purely 
correlative conjunctions, they w ould be expected to behave differently in situations that 
appear identical but follow either a causal or a totally arbitrary logic. 
STUDY II I followed this  line of reasoning by investig ating chimpanzees’ ability to  infer the 
location of hidden food by watching an external sequence of events. Unlike in STUDIES I and 
II, subjects were solely passive observers with  no opportunity for inte ractive m anipulation. 
The experim enter presented two kinds of even ts: on e that revealed a causal im perative—
elicited by the physical im pact of t he food item itself—and one that revealed an arbitrary 
sequence—elicited by a purely “m an-made” regular ity. Sim ilar to  STUDY II , potential 
differences in the sub jects’ decision making could provide a usef ul insight into the cognitive 
strategies used by chim panzees. This third study dealt with th e "postdictive aspect" of causal 
reasoning defined by V isalberghi and Tom asello (1998), because the only way to solve the 
given problem is by inferring back wards the preced ing cause from  the curren t event. For 
further details, see STUDY III: “Chimpanzees infer the location of a reward based on the effect 
of its weight.” 
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STUDY I 
 
 
Comparing the performances of apes and humans in the floating 
peanut task 
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Abstract 
 
Recently, Mendes et al. (2007) describ ed the use of a liquid to ol (water) in captiv e 
orangutans. Here, we tested chimpanzees an d gorillas for the first tim e with the sam e 
“floating peanut task.” None of the subjects so lved the task. In orde r to better understand the 
cognitive d emands of the task, w e further tested o ther populations  of chim panzees an d 
orangutans with the variation of the peanut initially floating or not. T wenty percent of the 
chimpanzees but none of the orang utans were successful. Additional cont rols rev ealed that 
successful subjects added water only if it was necessary to obtain the nut. Another experiment 
was conducted to investigate th e reason for the differences in perform ance between the  
unsuccessful (Experiment 1) and the successful  (Experiment 2) chimpanzee populations. We  
found tentative evidence for the view that functional fixe dness m ight have im paired the 
chimpanzees’ strategies  in the firs t experim ent. Finally, we tes ted ho w hum an children of 
different age classes perform in an analogous experimental setting. W ithin the o ldest group 
(8.3 years), 58 percent of the children solved  the problem, whereas in the youngest group (4.3 
years), only 8 percent solved it. 
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Introduction 
 
A variety of sophisticated tool-using behavior  is known to occur in several vertebrates, 
including birds and m ammals (Lefebvre, Nico lakakis, & Boire, 2002; Tom asello & Call, 
1997; van Schaik, Deaner, & Merrill, 1999). Reports of such behavior originate from natural 
observations (Boesch & Boesch, 1990; Fox, Si tompul, & van Schaik, 1999; Goodall, 1964; 
Hunt, 1996) as well as from  experimental studies (Köhler, 1925; Mulcahy, Call, & Dunbar, 
2005; Visalberghi & Trinca, 1989; Weir, et al., 2002). The vast majority of tools used by 
animals consist of solid materials or are constructed from them. 
Recently, Mendes and colleagu es reported five or angutans repeatedly spitting water into  a 
tube to retrieve a peanut that was floating at the bottom of the tube in a small amount of water 
(Mendes, Hanus, & Call, 2007). Releasing water fr om their m ouths into the tube raised the 
water level and brought the peanut within  reach. Addition ally, control condition s 
demonstrated that spitting inside the tube was not a general response that subjects displayed 
upon encountering an out-of-reach reward. In part icular, orangutans did not spit water into an 
empty tube upon encountering a peanut that was out of reach (in front of the tube). These data 
suggested that their spitting was goal-directed and performed to rem ove the peanut from  the 
tube.  
Even though archerfish (Toxotes jaculatrix) are also known to produce water stream s to catch 
their prey (Lüling, 1963), their behavior seem s to be hard-wir ed and there is no reason to 
assume that m uch cognitive f lexibility is invo lved; for example, it has  never been  reported  
that archerfish are capable of using their “spitting behavior” in a completely different and new 
context. For orangutans on the other hand, water spitting is not known to be a natural, species-
typical behavior. Nor did it play any role in the special living conditions of that particular zoo 
population tested by Mendes and colleagues (2007). Furtherm ore, because the solution 
appeared suddenly and without an y trial and error, the behavi or displayed by the orangutans 
qualified as a manifestation of insightful behavior (Köhler, 1925; Thorpe, 1956). 
However, the study of Mendes et al. (2007) suffers from several lim itations. From a  
comparative point of view, it is unknown whether other species of great apes would be able to 
solve the ta sk. This inf ormation is crucia l to m aking infe rences about the evolution of 
cognitive flexibility in nonhum an apes and hu mans. It is also im portant to test other ap e 
populations of the same species to see how widespread this abili ty is among other individuals 
within the species. From a cognitive point of view, it is unclear whether apes would have also 
solved the task if the peanut had not already been floating in the water. Clearly, encountering 
a dry tube with a peanut at the bottom is a m ore demanding task than encountering one with a 
floating peanut, because it requires thinking about water as a possible solution withou t having 
already seen its effect. Another as pect that requires furth er sc rutiny is the  apes ’ genera l 
tendency to add water to the tube regardless of the presence of th e reward. Although Mendes 
et al. (2007) ran a series of control conditi ons to assess whether orangutans spat water 
indiscriminately into the tube regardless of the position of the peanut, more data are needed to 
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confirm their results. The aim of our study was to provide some answers to the open questions 
raised by Mendes et al.’s (2007) results.  
In Experiment 1, we tested ch impanzees and gor illas hou sed in the sam e facility as the 
orangutans tested by Mendes et al. (2007), using the same method.  
In Experiment 2, we expanded our sam ple by including two new populations of chimpanzees 
and orangutans living in sanctu aries in Uganda and Indonesia, respectively. In addition to the 
original test condition in which the peanut was floating in a sm all amount of water, w e 
presented a condition in which the peanut was lying at the bottom of a completely empty tube. 
Furthermore, successful subjects were presente d with a series of control conditions to 
investigate whether or not subjects added water only when it was useful for solving the task.  
 
The aim  of Experim ent 3 was to explain the stark differences in perform ance between the 
Leipzig ch impanzees (Exp. 1) and the Ngam ba chimpanzees (Exp. 2). W e conjectured th at 
Leipzig chimpanzees might have failed to use wa ter from the drink ing devices ins talled in  
their quarters to solv e the task because those devices were associated with drinking to satiate 
thirst. Thus, functional fixedness  (Adam son, 1952; Duncker, 1945) m ay have been 
responsible for the Leip zig chimpanzees’ poor performance. We tested th is idea by in stalling 
a new drinker and retesting som e of the chimpanzees in the floating peanut task. Note that all 
Ngamba chimpanzees were tested with a new drinker. Even though there are some indications 
of functional fixedness in the l iterature (e.g., Köhler, 1925), to our knowledge, this is the first 
time that this phenomenon has been experimentally addressed in a nonhuman species.  
In Experiment 4, we tested the ability of 4-, 6-, and 8-year-old  children to so lve the floating 
peanut task in an experim ental setting analogous to that presented to the apes. W e recruited 
relatively older children  because the dem anding task requires a great deal of innovation an d 
creativity. Like the apes in Expe riment 2, half of the children received the condition in which 
the tube wa s quarter filled with water and ha lf of them  received the co ndition in which the  
tube was empty. 
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Experiment 1:  
Leipzig chimpanzees and gorillas 
 
The goal of this experiment wa s to investigate and compare the performances of two species 
untested in the floating  peanut task—nam ely chim panzees ( Pan troglodytes ) and  western  
lowland gorillas ( Gorilla gorilla )—with those of the orangutans ( Pongo abelii)  tested in 
Mendes et al.’s (2007) study. As in the original experim ent, the task require d subjects to 
retrieve a p eanut f rom inside a Ple xiglas t ube by collecting water from a drinker and then 
spitting it into the tube  in order to  m ake the peanut float and bring it  within the subjec t’s 
reach. 
 
  
Method 
 
Subjects 
Twenty-four subjects participated in the present study, 19 ch impanzees (Pan troglodytes) and 
5 gorillas (Gorilla gorilla; see Table 1 for the details). The chim panzee group consisted of 5 
males ( mean age  = 12 years) and 14 fem ales ( mean age  = 18 years); the gorilla group 
consisted of 1 male (24 years) and 4 females (mean age = 19 years). All of them were socially 
housed at the W olfgang Köhler Prim ate Resear ch Center (WKPRC) located in the Leipzig 
Zoo, Germany. Indoor and outdoor enclosures  are furnished with vegetation, clim bing 
structures, and visual barriers. Although subjec ts had received a variety of cognitive tests 
during the last 8 years (see http://wkprc.eva.mpg.de for additional details), this was the f irst 
time that th ey were con fronted with the f loating peanut task. All subj ects were individually 
tested and were not deprived of food or water during the experiment. 
 
Apparatus and procedure 
The apparatus and procedure were the sam e as in the Mendes et al. (2007) study. A  
transparent Plexiglas tube (26 cm  long, 5 cm  wide) was vertically attached to a panel inside 
the subjects’ testing room. The bottom end of the tube was closed and the top was open; three 
metal rings held the tube in place. The tube was quarter filled with water and a shelled peanut 
floated inside the tube, unreachable for the subjects. A drinker that was situated 0.5–1 m from 
the tube has always been in the testing room since its construction, and subjects were familiar 
with its presence and its use. Prior to a subject’s entrance, the testing room was cleared of any 
material th at could po tentially be u sed as a tool to reach the peanut. There was no visual 
contact between the tested subject and other conspecifics.  
Each subject receiv ed a total of  eig ht trials (on e trial per day). Each  trial had a maxim um 
duration of 20 m inutes. The first 10 m inutes were standard, m eaning that all of the subjects 
received that exposure tim e regardless of thei r m otivation or effort. The trial ended if the 
subjects retrieved the reward earlier. If the subject was still working to get the  peanut after 10 
minutes, the experim enter (E ) allow ed an ad ditional 5-m inute period. Again, if the subject  
retrieved th e reward or  lost in terest, the tria l was term inated but if  the subjec t r emained 
interested in the ta sk, it con tinued for an additional 5 fin al m inutes. Consequently, each  
subject had a m aximum of 20 m inutes per trial to solv e the problem and obtain the reward, 
provided that they showed interest during the tr ial (see Figure 1). E provided no specific cues 
on how to solve the task and was only allowed to  knock on the tube or call the subject’s nam e 
in order to gain its attention.  
 
 
 
Figure 1: Schematic illustration of the procedure used in Experiments 1 and 2. 
 
 
Results 
 
None of the 5 gorillas an d 19 chimpanzees retrieved the peanut from inside the tube.  Nor did 
any of the m add water to the tube. Neverthele ss, chimpanzees spent on average 10 m inutes 
(mean = 10.63, SD = 0.74) actively trying to get the reward. 
 
 
Discussion 
 
The solution to this task  required su bjects to tak e water f rom the drink er and sp it it into the  
tube in order to ra ise the water leve l and bring the peanut within reac h. None of the subjects 
were able to find an appropriate solution to  the task. However, we doubt that lack of 
motivation accounts for this failur e. Subjects appeared interest ed and behaved actively in 
trying to extra ct the  peanut f rom the tube. The m ajority tried different—though 
unsuccessful—strategies: hand actions such as  pulling, lifting, banging, or inserting their 
fingers, and m outh actions such as biting a nd licking. Som e subjects even collected water 
from the drinker and spat it at E, but never in to or at the tube. This behavior could be 
interpreted as frustration at their failure to get the peanut. 
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The discrepancy between the chimpanzees’ and gorillas’ performance in the current study and 
the orangutans’ in the Mendes et al. (2007) study is striking. Af ter eight trials, none of the 
apes in the current study added water to the tube, whereas all fi ve orangutans solved the task 
from the first trial onwards. It should be stre ssed that all three ape species were housed under 
the sam e conditions a t the sam e f acility (WKPRC, Leipzig), and the apparatus and the 
procedure were identical for all apes. Given th at chim panzees are thou ght to b e es pecially 
skilful and innovative problem solvers (e.g., Köhler, 1925; Rensch & Döhl, 1967), the current 
findings are all the more puzzling. The small sample size involved in the reported studies may 
have contributed to these discrepant results. In particular, it is uncl ear whether the observed 
differences between orangutans and African apes (chimpanzees and gorillas) reflect a genuine 
interspecific difference in problem -solving ab ilities or whether they repres ent a m ere 
sampling artifact. In the next experiment, we took up this question by testing other samples of 
orangutans and chimpanzees on the floating peanut task. 
Another open issue in the original Mendes at al . (2007) study is whether or not the presence 
of water inside the tube influe nced the orangutans’ behavior. In  other w ords, how crucial is 
seeing a floating peanut to solving the task ? Although Mendes et al. (2007) included control 
conditions that addressed this issue by using an empty tube, these were conducted after the 
experimental condition. Once subjects had solved  the problem with the floating peanut, they 
also succeeded when the tube was dry, which suggests that seeing water was not necessary for 
producing a solution. However, it rem ains unclear if  subjects would be ab le to solve the task 
in the first place without initially seeing any water inside the tube. In the next experiment, we 
therefore investigated the eff ect of seeing a floating peanut on the likelihood of solving the 
task. Half of the subjects received the original  test version with a quarter-filled tube and a 
floating peanut, whereas the other half was confronted with a dr y tube and a peanut lying at 
its bottom. 
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Experiment 2:  
Sanctuary orangutans and chimpanzees 
 
The first goal of this experim ent was to te st one additional sam ple of sanctuary-housed 
chimpanzees and orangutans to con firm the observed differences between the chimpanzees 
and orangutans housed in Leipzig. The second goal of this experiment was to find out whether 
apes were able to solve the task when seeing the peanut at the bottom of a dry tube rather than 
floating in water. 
 
 
Method 
 
Subjects 
Thirty-five subjec ts pa rticipated in  the  pres ent study  (s ee Table  1 f or the  de tails): Ten  
orangutans (Pongo abelii) housed at the Orangutan Care Center Pasir Panjang in Kalim antan, 
Indonesia and 20 chimpanzees ( Pan troglodytes ) housed at the Nga mba Island Chimpanzee 
Sanctuary, Uganda. The oranguta n group consisted of 6 males ( mean age  = 6 years) and 4 
females ( mean age  = 5 years); th e chim panzee group consisted of 9 m ales ( mean age  = 8 
years) and 16 fe males (mean age = 12 years). Subjects in both sanctuaries were individually 
tested and were not deprived of food or water during the experiment. 
 
 
Apparatus and procedure 
We used the sam e apparatus as in E xperiment 1. Again, a Plexiglas tube and a drinker were 
installed in the testing room , located 0.5–1 m  apart from  each other. Subjects received 8 
(chimpanzees at Ngam ba) and 10 trials (orangu tans in  Kalim antan), depending on specif ic 
time constraints at each sanctuary. We conducted two trials per day (morning and afternoon)1, 
which lasted 10–20 minutes (or less if the subject obtained the re ward earlier). The procedure 
was identical to the one used in Experiment 1 (see Figure 1). The drinker providing water was 
installed a f ew days before comm encement of the experiment in both sanctuaries. Whereas 
the drinker at Ngam ba only released water wh en being pressed, the water in Kalim antan was 
running all the tim e (due to t echnical constraints). The dri nker at the Nga mba was very 
similar to the one at the Wolfgang Koehler Primate Research Centre described in Experiment 
1. 
 
 
1 The on ly ex ception was when  testin g on e fe male fro m the d ry g roup (Sallie), d ue to a th understorm th at 
occurred on the morning of one of the testing days. 
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Experimental phase  
There were two conditions: wet and dry. Half of  the subjects (5 orangutans, 12 chimpanzees ) 
were presented with the wet condition in which a  shelled peanut floated inside the tube, as in 
Experiment 1. Again, the tube was only quarter f illed with water so that the peanut could not 
be reached  directly. No other tools were avai lable. T he other half of the subjects (5  
orangutans, 13 chim panzees) received the dry condition in which the re was no water in  the 
tube and the peanut was lying at the bottom of it. The procedure remained exactly the same as 
in the previous experiment. Ho wever, there was one peculiarit y at Ngamba: If the subjects 
presented w ith the wet condition failed to add any water during the first four trials, they 
received two additional trials in w hich the amount of water inside  the tube was doubled—
although the peanut remained out of  direct reach. If subjects presented with th e dry condition 
did not succeed in the first four trials, they immediately received the wet condition from the 
fifth trial on wards. If subject s still failed in th e following tw o wet trials, they received two 
additional wet trials in which the amount of water inside the tube was doubled (e.g., Trial 1 to 
4: dry => Trial 5 to 6: quarter-filled => Trial 7 to 8: half-filled).2  
We scored the frequency of chi mpanzees’ sp itting behavior, as well as  whether an d when 
subjects were ultim ately successful or not . Additionally, we coded other tube-directed 
behavior that was perform ed with hands a nd/or feet (e.g., pulling, push ing, lifting). Finally,  
we exam ined whether subjects behaved differen tly on tho se variables bef ore and af ter the  
solution was discovered.  
 
Control phase 
Upon completing the test phase, th e successful subjects advanced to the control phase. Those 
subjects re ceived th ree kinds of  control tr ials ( top, table, and dry ), with each c ondition 
occurring f our tim es in total. Th e order of  presenta tion of  the 12 control tria ls was 
counterbalanced within and between  blocks. In the dry control, the peanut was located at the 
bottom of  the tube (ex actly as in the expe rimental dry co ndition). In  the top co ntrol, the  
peanut was attached (glued) to the top of the empty tube and was therefore easily within reach 
of the subject. In the table control, the peanut rested on a platform 30 cm in front of the empty 
tube beyond the subject’s reach (see Figure 2). We scored how of ten subjects spat water in to 
the tube du ring the firs t 2 m inutes of each cond ition and calculated th e mean percentage of 
trials in which subjects  spat into  the  tube  at least once.  In  addition,  we m easured the mean 
latency until the f irst s pit occu rred and until they f inally obtained th e reward in  the dry  
control. 
 
 
 
2 We presented t he ad ditional wet trials t o ev aluate whether t his ex tra in formation wo uld facilitate th eir 
inventiveness.  
 Figure 2: (a) Wet condition: a quarter-filled Plexiglas tube with a floating peanut; (b) Dry condition: an 
empty Plexiglas tube with a peanut lying at the bottom; (c) Top control: an empty Plexiglas tube with a 
peanut glued onto the top; (d) Dry cont rol = dry co ndition; (e) Table control: an empty Plexiglas tube 
with a peanut lying out of reach at 30 cm distance. 
 
 
Results 
 
Experimental phase  
None of the 10 orangutans solved the task. Only  two subjects (one m ale, one female) spat 
water into the tube, but failed to continue doing so to the point where they could have reached 
the reward. These two subjects belonged to the dry-condition group, whereas none of the 
subjects from the wet-condition g roup used the water at all.  Five of 24 chim panzees solved 
the task. Two of the m (one female, one male) belonged to the dry-condition group, and three 
of them (two females, one male) belonged to the wet-condition group. Four subjects found the 
solution within the first trial and another subj ect in the second trial.  The five successful 
subjects added water on average in  73.5 percent of the trials and got the p eanut on average in 
65.5 percent of the trials.3  
It took the successful chimpanzees on average 260 seconds (s.e.m. = 89.4) to produce the first 
spit (mean latency dry = 199 s; m ean latency wet = 301 s), and after a total of 597 seconds 
(s.e.m. = 59.7), they finally m anaged to get th e reward (mean latency dry = 665 s; m ean 
latency wet = 552 s). Due to indi vidual differences in their spit ting techniques, their facial 
anatomy, and the test condition, subjects needed between 2 and 12 portions of water (spits) to 
bring the peanut within reach. However, once the solution was discovered, subjects spat much 
more readily during the following trials. It then took them  on average only 38 seconds ( s.e.m. 
= 8.0) to produce the first spit and after 142 seconds ( s.e.m. = 41.3), they already received the 
reward. At the sam e tim e, the fre quency of tube-directed hand and f oot actions declined 
dramatically from  an average of 27.5 ( s.e.m. = 13.1) before the solution was found to an 
average of 0.8 ( s.e.m. = 0.4) after the solutio n was found. One explanation could be that 
                                                 
3 If we ex clude Katie (who  stopped sp itting after th e seco nd trial), th e percentage of trials in  wh ich sp itting 
occurred increases to 85.6 percent and the percentage of successful trials increases to 78.7 percent. 
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ineffective m anual manipulations (e.g., hand and/ or foot actions) are dispensable once the 
actual solution (water spitting) is known.  
The peculiar behavior of two chimpanzees is worth mentioning. One adult female chimpanzee 
(Katie) was successful during the first trial. After that she continued to spit water into the tube 
for one m ore trial (but without getting the rewa rd) and finally stopped spitting entirely fr om 
the third trial onwards. One juvenile m ale chimpanzee from the dry-con dition group (Okech) 
solved the problem during the first trial but failed to add enough water to  reach the p eanut in 
the f ollowing tria ls. He spat water  during two m ore trials  but had severe dif ficulties in  
channeling the water into the sm all opening of the tube. He f inally lost interest after several 
unsuccessful attempts. After four unsuccessful ( but vigorous) attem pts in the dry condition, 
we decided to present him  with the wet conditi on. In the first two trials, he still did not 
manage to add enough water at th e beginning (Trials 1 and 2). However, when the amount of 
water inside the tube was increased (to half filled) from the third trial onwards, he finally spat 
enough water (to reach the peanut) and continue d to solve the problem throughout the five 
remaining trials. It seemed that even though he had already found the solution during the very 
first trial of the dry condition, he simply faile d to m aster the appropr iate spitting technique, 
which caused him  to give up. Because less water is needed to solve the task in the wet 
condition, he was once again motivated and succeeded up to the end of the experiment.  
In addition to the five successful subjects, four other individuals spat w ater into the  tube bu t 
failed to complete the task; in other words, they did not add enough water to bring the peanut 
within reach. One of them  (a m ale) belonged to the d ry-condition group, and th ree of the m 
(two m ales, one fe male) belonged  to the wet-condition group. On average, th ose four  
unsuccessful subject added water (at least once) in 41.8 percent of all trials. 
 
Control phase  
Although only 4 chim panzees consistently so lved the task during th e test phase (recall that 
Katie initially solved the task but the n lost interest), a total o f 10 subjects entered th e control 
phase. To increase our sample size, we included 6 additional chimpanzees from Ngamba who 
originally failed the task but mastered it in the course of another experiment (Tennie, Call, & 
Tomasello, in prep.).  
There was a significant difference between the three control condi tions in the percentage of  
trials in which spitting  occurred at leas t once (Friedm an exact test: F = 16.76, n = 10, p < 
0.001). Pairwise comparisons revealed that chimpanzees added water significantly more often 
in the dry control than in th e top control (Wilcoxon exact test: T+= 9, n = 10, p = 0.004, two-
tailed) and the tab le control (Wilcoxon exact tes t: T+= 9, n = 10, p = 0.004, two-tailed). In 
contrast, there was no significant difference between the top control and the table control with 
respect to the number of trials in which spitting occurred (Wilcoxon exact test: T+= 1, n = 10, 
p = 1.00, two-tailed; see Figure 3a). 
 
 Figure 3a: Mean number of trials in which subjects spat into the tube for each of the control conditions 
in Experiment 2. * p < .05. Error bars depict the standard errors of the means. 
 
An analysis of the overall frequency of spitting confirmed a significant difference between the 
three control conditions (Friedman test: F = 11.03, n = 10, p = 0.002). Pair-wise com parisons 
revealed that chimpanzees spat sign ificantly more often in the dry con trol compared to to p 
control (W ilcoxon exact test: T+= 8 , n = 10, p = 0.008, two-tailed) and the table control 
(Wilcoxon exact test: T+= 8, n =  10, p = 0.008, two-tailed). In contrast, there was no 
difference between the top control and the tabl e control concerning the total number of spits 
produced by the subjects (W ilcoxon exact test: T+ = 3, n = 10, p = 1.00, two-tailed). Subjects 
spat water seven tim es m ore of ten in the dr y control compared to the two other control 
conditions (see Figure 3b). 
 
 
Figure 3b : Mean number of w ater p ortions ( spits) t hat subj ects added in t otal f or e ach of  t he t hree 
control conditions. * p < .05. Error bars depict the standard errors of the means. 
 
Finally, we analyzed  when spitting  occurred during the trial by consid ering the la tencies to  
spit in the tria ls in  which subje cts added wa ter at leas t once. There was again  a significant 
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difference between conditions (Friedman exact test: F = 6.40, n = 5, p = 0.039) 4. Although 
subjects ten ded to add water e arlier in  the  dr y contro l tha n in the o ther con trol c onditions 
(mean latencies: dry control = 20.7 s, top c ontrol = 64.5 s, table control = 41.0 s), pairwise 
comparisons failed to reach significance level (Wilcoxon exact tests: dry vs. top: T+ = 5, n = 
5, p = 0.063; dry vs. table: T+ = 5, n = 5, p = 0.094; top vs. table: T+ = 5, n = 5, p = 0.125, two-
tailed in all cases). 
 
 
Discussion 
 
Two of the orangutans added water to the tube but did not add enough water to get the peanut. 
In contrast, nine chim panzees added water to the tube, five of whom  added enough water to  
get the peanut. Four of those ch impanzees continued to so lve the task in subsequent trials . 
Furthermore, control tests show ed that successf ul chimpanzees preferentially added water to 
the tube when the peanut was inside the tube, not simply when the peanut was present yet out 
of reach. Chim panzees seemed to add water excl usively to affect the position of the p eanut, 
which confirms the goal-directedness of their pe rformance. Results  are  also consis tent with  
the notion of insightful behavior (K öhler, 1925; Lethmate, 1982). Next, we discuss in m ore 
detail the orangutans’ and chimpanzees’ results in turn. 
The orangutans’ negative results stand in star k contrast to the results obtained by Mendes et 
al. (2007). The main difference in the setup between the two studies was that a running stream 
of water was visually available in the current study. This methodological difference, however, 
should in fact have favored the subjects in our  study by calling their at tention to the water. 
Interestingly, the two orangutans that spat wate r into the tube belonged to the dry-condition 
group, that is, they had not  seen the peanut floating inside th e tube. It is c onceivable that a 
lack of m otivation may have played an im portant role in the orangutans’  failure to solve the  
task. The  major ity of  th em lost inte rest in  the  tube/ta sk af ter a  f ew unsuccessf ul a ttempts, 
despite repeated efforts by the experim enter to  draw their a ttention to the tube. Why those 
subjects—in contrast to the zoo orangutans of  Mendes et al. (2007)—lacked m otivation 
remains unclear.  
Unlike the orangutans, the chimpanzees overall seemed much more interested in the task and 
therefore more motivated to find a solution, which resulted in various strategies to retrieve the 
peanut (e.g., hand actions such  as pulling, lifting, banging, or inserting their fingers, and 
mouth actions such as biting and licking). Out of the nine chimpanzees that spat water at least 
once into the tube, five subjects  finally added enough water to obt ain the reward. It is unclear 
why the other four subjects stopped spitting water after having made a “first step” towards the 
final goal. It appeared that all of the subj ects who spat unsuccessf ully released only tiny 
 
4 Instead of assigning an arbitrary value (e.g. 120 s) to subjects that did not spit at all, we decided to include in 
the analyses only those 5 subjects that spat in all three control conditions.  
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amounts of water, preferring to swallow most of the water they  retrieved from  the drinker. 
Why one subject (Katie) that solved the pr oblem during the first trial stopped during the  
following trials remains unclear. 
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Experiment 3:  
Functional fixedness 
 
Upon completing Experiment 1 and as part of a different project, (Tennie, Call, & Tomasello, 
in prep.) te sted the ability of the initially  uns uccessful Leipzig ch impanzees to solve th e 
floating peanut task by observa tion. This study required traini ng one chim panzee (Frodo) to 
solve the task in order to  become a demonstrator for the other chim panzees. Over a period of 
several days, different methods were repeated ly tried until Frodo successfully added water to  
the tube. He did this by reliably gathering wa ter from several other sources, consisting of a 
water bottle hanging from  the mesh, running water from  a hose,  a sm all recipient full of 
water, a water jet rising out of a hole next to the old drinker, and a “new” drinker. Similar in 
working design to the old drinker, the new one  was m ounted on a plate of a different color 
and appearance, and was placed in a different  location. Although Frodo successfully gathered 
water from this new water source, he could not be enticed to use water from the “old” familiar 
drinker present in Experiment 1, despite our attempts to call his attention to it by knocking on 
the drinker (from the f ront and the b ack), pointing to it, or ap proaching the location where it 
was installed. Frodo’s behavior was reminiscent of what is referred to in humans as functional 
fixedness. To Frodo, the old drinke r’s fixed function was prim arily to quench thirst (another 
known function was to p rovide water for spitting at people). This seemed to have cognitively 
blocked Frodo from  see ing the old drinker’s po tentially new function of providing water to 
solve the floating peanut task. The functiona l fixedness hypothesis would explain w hy Frodo 
readily used new drinkers of different colors, kinds, and at different locations. They simply 
may not ha ve had the sam e fixed function as the old drinker. If the functional fixedness 
hypothesis is true, it m ight also explain th e differences observed between the Leipzig 
chimpanzees (Exp. 1) and the Ngamba chim panzees (Exp. 2). All subjects at Ngamba were 
tested with a new drinker (9 of 25 subjects added water at leas t once and 5 of 25 subjects 
solved the problem), whereas all 19 subjects in Leipzig were tested with an old drinker (none 
of the subjects added w ater at all). We theref ore decided to test functional fixedness as a 
potential reason for the Leipzig ch impanzees’ poor perform ance and investigated  whether  
their performance would improve to compare to that of the Ngamba chimpanzees if they were 
presented with a new drinker. 
 
 
Method 
 
Subjects 
We tested the sam e Leipzig chim panzees ( Pan troglodytes ) as in Experim ent 1, except for 
Frodo, Robert, and Natascha (see Table 1 for th e details). Frodo was ex cluded because of his 
special train ing his tory (see abov e), whereas R obert and Natascha w ere not available for 
testing during that time. In addition, we test ed three p reviously un tested ch impanzees 
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(Unyoro, Lobo, Tai), bringing the total to 19 subjects. Prior to the current experiment, none of 
these subjects had solved the task. 
 
Apparatus and procedure 
In addition to the old drinker used in Experim ent 1, a new drinker was installed, so that the 
subjects had two drinkers to choose from . This new drinker was functionally identical to the 
original one but with differences in design. The metal plate on which it was mounted (10 cm x 
13 cm) was dissimilar in color and appearance to the old dr inker. We tried to m aintain equal 
distances b etween th e apparatus and the o ld and the new drinker. However, for som e 
chimpanzees, this was not possible due to the spat ial restrictions of their testing room s. For  
these seven subjects, the new drinkers were circ a 60 cm  closer to the ap paratus than the old  
drinkers (90 vs. 150 cm). 
Subjects were divided into two groups. Subjects in the dry group fi rst received two trials with 
the peanut lying at the bottom  of an em pty tube (dry trials), followed by two additio nal trials 
with the p eanut f loating in a qua rter-filled tub e (wet trials ) if  they ha d not solve d the dry  
trials. Subjects in the wet group received four we t trials in total (see pr ocedure of Exp 2 for a 
detailed description of the two conditions). Both groups received only one trial per day. In all 
other respects, the procedure wa s identic al to the one in Experim ent 1. During all tr ials, 
subjects had  access to the old and the new drin kers, both o f which were functional all th e 
time. 
We scored the frequenc y of a ch impanzee’s spitting into the tube, the source from which the  
water was taken (old drinker, new drinker, or both), and whether the sub jects were ultimately 
successful o r not.  The data were analyzed in the sam e way as in previous experim ents. 
Finally, we calcu lated the m ean percentage of tria ls in whic h subjects spat into the tube an d 
their success rate to compare the data between chimpanzee populations.5 
 
 
Results 
 
In the dry group (n = 10), two s ubjects spat water into  the tube at least once (Fifi 1st trial, 
Jahaga 2nd trial). However, none of them added enough water to obtain the reward. In the wet 
group (n = 9), three subjects spat water into the tube (Lom e 1st trial, Ulla 4th trial, Tai 4th 
trial). Two of them  (Lome, Tai) added enough wa ter to obtain the rewa rd. All subjects used 
water from the new drinker to spit into the t ube. As the combined data f rom the dry and the 
 
5 For each subject, mean spitt ing rate wa s calculated as nu mber of spitting trials divi ded by total num ber of 
given trials a nd mean success rate wa s calculated as number of success trials divided by total num ber of given 
trials, respectively. Nonparametric tests were used because data did not fulfill homogeneity criteria of parametric 
statistics. 
 
wet group show, 5 out of 19 subjects added water to the tube at least once, and 2 of them were 
successful.  
These data were compared with those for Experiments 1 and 2. Figure 4 shows the frequency 
of spitting  (regardless of  success) for each o f the three groups. Chimpanzees that were 
initially tested with the new drinker in Experiments 2 and 3 spat significantly more often than 
those that were tes ted with the o ld drinker in  Experiment 1 ( Mann-Whitney exact test: U = 
171, nnew = 28, nold = 19, p = 0.005). However, the differences between groups disappeared 
when the Leipzig chimpanzees were tested with the new drinker (Mann-Whitney exact test: U 
= 212, nNgamba = 25, nLeipzig = 19, p = 0.471). 
A similar picture em erged for the success rate. Subjects that initially ha d access to the new 
drinker tend ed to outperfor m subjects with access to the old drinker (Mann-W hitney exact 
test: U = 209, nnew = 28, nold = 19, p = 0.068), but differences between groups disappeared 
when all su bjects were given access  to th e new drinker (Mann-W hitney exact test: U = 215, 
nNgamba = 25, nLeipzig = 19, p = 0.452). 
The three subjects from Leipzig that in itially receiv ed the new drinker (Exp.  3) are 
particularly valuable for purposes of com parison with the Nga mba chimpanzees because, 
unlike the o ther Leipzig  chimpanzees, they  faced  the tes t for the first tim e. There were n o 
significant differences between these two groups in the frequency of spitting (Mann-Whitney 
exact test: U = 34, nNgamba = 25, nLeipzig = 3, p = 0.720) or success in getting the peanut (Mann-
Whitney exact test: U = 34, nNgamba = 25, nLeipzig = 3, p = 0.929). 
  
 
Figure 4: Mean spitting rate for each group = Su m of the individual spitting rates divided by number of 
subjects in each group. (a): 19 subjects from Leipzig tested with the new drinker absent, (b): 25 subjects 
from N gamba tested w ith t he new  dri nker present. ( c): 16 su bjects f rom ( a) pl us 3 new  subj ects f rom 
Leipzig tested with the new drinker present.  
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Discussion 
 
Adding a new drinker to the setup elim inated the differences in perform ance between the 
Leipzig chimpanzees in  Experim ent 1 and the Ngamba chimpanzees in  Experim ent 2. The 
introduction of the new drinker  increased the f requency of spitting and rates of success. One 
possible explanation f or this phenom enon mi ght be the proposed functional fixedness 
hypothesis (Adamson, 1952; Duncker, 1945). 
One could  argue that the incr eased perform ance observed in  th is study  co mpared to 
Experiment 1 was due not to the introduction of the new drinker but to the retesting of the 
same chimpanzees. In o ther words, providing additional trials rathe r than a new drinker m ay 
explain th is result. Ho wever, the f ollowing reasons m ake this unlik ely: Fir st, the thre e 
chimpanzees that received the task for the first time with access to the new drinker performed 
at com parable levels to the Ngamba chim panzees. Second, in strict  accordan ce with the 
functional fixedness hypothesis, subjects in the current experiment gathered water exclusively 
from the new drinker. Third, subjects either le arned quickly how to spit into the tu be or did  
not learn it at all. Of th e 10 apes (5 orangutans, Mendes et al., 2007; 5 chim panzees, Exp. 2) 
that have solved this task so far, 9 solved it in the first trial and 1 in  the second. In contrast, 
none of the original subjects fr om the Leipzig group solved the problem during the course of 
eight trials. Fourth, there is the interesting case of Frodo, who was adept at solving the task by 
gathering w ater from  different sources but coul d not be induced to use water from  the old 
drinker. These four aspects offer ten tative evidence that functional fixedness m ay have been 
responsible for the differences detected betw een the Leipzig chim panzees (Exp. 1) and the 
Ngamba chimpanzees (Exp. 2) in the floating peanut task. 
 
 
Experiment 4:  
Children 
 
Experiments 2 and 3 as well as the results of Mendes et al. (2007) showed that som e 
chimpanzees and orang utans are able to  solv e the floatin g peanut task  in a flex ible and 
innovative way. In this experim ent, we invest igated how hum an children performed in the 
same task in a com parable experimental sett ing. Age groups were de termined based on the 
authors’ estimation of cognitive stage of development. 
 
 
Method 
 
Participants 
Seventy-two children, 36 boys and 36 girls took part  in the experiment. There were three age 
classes: 4.3  years ( mean = 50.5 m onths, SD = 1.56), 6.3 years ( mean = 74.5 m onths, SD = 
1.78), and 8.3 years ( mean = 96.6 m onths, SD = 1.53). In each age cla ss, there were 12 boys 
and 12 girls assigned to one of  two conditions, dry and wet  (see Exp. 2 and 3). All children 
were recruited from kindergartens in Leipzig, Germany. The majority of children came from a 
middle-class White background.  
 
 
 
Apparatus and procedure 
The sam e Plexig las tub e was used as in the pr evious experim ents. Instead of a drinker, a 
water-filled pitcher was provided in close proximity to the appara tus. The Plexiglas tube was 
attached to a vertically orie nted wooden board (40 x 10 cm) th at was mounted to a table (see 
Figure 5). As in the ape studies, no other tools were available in the testing room.  
 
 
Figure 5: Experimental setting used for the children.  
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All children received only one test trial in total. This was because it was impossible to prevent 
them from conversing with other people before s ubsequent trials. In order to get used to the 
pitcher and the test situation, all children were asked to use the pitcher to water some plants in 
the testing room prior to star ting the test trial. At this tim e, the appara tus (tube) was covered 
by a blanket. After watering the plants, the child (C) was asked to place th e pitcher on the test 
table (50–80 cm  distance from  t he tube) befo re leaving the room together with the 
experimenter (E). After a few m inutes, C and E entered the room  again, and E explained the 
problem to C: “Let’s play a gam e. Look, there is  a peanut inside the tu be. If you can get that 
peanut, you will win a reward (Kind er Surprise). Unfortunately I cannot help you b ecause I 
have im portant paperwork to do.” E then sa t down in another part of the room (4–6 m  
distance from the apparatus), where he/she stayed during the entire testing phase.  
A trial lasted a maximum of 8 minutes (or less if C got the peanut  sooner). If C did not solve 
the task after 4 m inutes had elapsed, E verbally encouraged C to  try whatever solution he/she 
might have in mind (“If you have an idea, just try!”). No other cues were given by E. Finally, 
after 8 m inutes had elapsed, E asked C one la st tim e whether he/she would like to try 
something else. If the child had no further idea s, the trial ended. All children were given a 
reward (Kinder Surprise) at the end, regardless of their success.  
We scored whether or not participants solved the task. In addition we measured the latency up 
to when the  f irst por tion of  water was added as well as when partic ipants f inally got th e 
peanut. 
 
 
Results 
 
Figure 6 p resents the n umber of children who solved the task as a f unction of age and  
condition. W ithin the youngest age class (4;3 years), only two children solved the task by 
pouring water into the tube. Those two partic ipants belonged to the wet-condition group. 
Within the middle age class (6;3 years), 10 child ren solved the task: Six of them  belonged to 
the wet-condition group and 4 belonged to th e dry-condition group. W ithin the oldest age 
class (8;3 years), 14 children solved the task : Nine of them belonged to the wet-condition 
group and 5 belonged to the dry-con dition group. We ran a logistic regression to analyze the 
effect of sex, age class, and test condition (as covariates) on success rate (as dependent 
variable). O lder childre n perform ed significantly better than younger ones ( B = 1.32, p = 
0.01). Additionally, participan ts from the wet group were significan tly more successful than  
those from the dry group ( B = 1.24, p = 0.03). Gender had no effect on children’s ability to 
solve the task in any of the three age classes (B < .001, p = 1.00). 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 6: Number of successful children (out of 12) for each of the three age classes. Grey bars represent 
participants in the dry-condition group; black bars represent participants in the wet-condition group. * p 
< .05. 
 
Apart from analyzing the success rate, we also identified a clear age effect on the latency until 
the first portion of water was added into the tube. Due to  the small number of successful 4-
year-olds, we com bined the successful 4- and 6-year-olds and com pared them to th e 
successful 8-year-olds. Older children needed less than half of the time to find the appropriate 
solution that younger children requir ed (Mann-Whitney exact test: U = 40, nyoung = 12, nold = 
14, p = 0.022, two-tailed, mean latencies: 4–6-year-olds: 249 s; 8-year-olds: 91 s). 
 
 
Discussion 
 
Children solved the floating peanut problem , but success strongly depended on age and 
condition. Whereas only 8 percent of the 4-year-olds solved the task, this number increased to 
42 percent and 58 percent in 6-  an d 8-year-old s, respectiv ely. Additionally, children who 
found the peanut floating on water were m ore likely to solve the task. Taken together, the 8-
year-olds who saw the floating pe anut were th e most successful group (75 percent success), 
and the 4-year olds who encountered  the dry peanut were the least su ccessful ones (0 percen t 
success). 
Despite the high success of 8-year-olds in th e wet conditio n, many children in o ther groups 
consistently failed to solve th e task. W e can rule out a m otivational deficit in the younger 
group as an explanation  for the results, because they were very interested in the reward and 
the vas t m ajority of th em spent a great deal of tim e and effort trying to get the peanut. 
Likewise, we do not assum e th at the relativ ely low sco res were caused by the child ren 
perceiving the water in the pitcher as either unavailable or unusable. Although that possibility 
cannot be fully excluded, it rem ains unlikely, given that we e xplicitly drew the children’s 
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attention to the wate r in the p itcher (watering the plants) prior to the tes t. This in tu rn raises 
the possibility that wate ring the plants may have interfered with solving  the task be cause the 
pitcher then acquired a “watering function.” However, the children watered the plants only 
once––which should have been too little exposure to block other functions, making functional 
fixedness equally unlikely. Moreover, we used a transparent pitch er r ather th an a  typica l 
watering can to reduce functi onal fixedness effects as m uch as possible. Although we could 
have opted for not having them use the pitcher to water the plants before the task, we felt it  
important to show them that it was permissible to use the pitcher but without explicitly calling 
attention to it a s a potential tool. Otherwise, the children may have in terpreted such behavior 
as a communicative cue regarding the relevance of the pitcher to the test. 
The strategies deployed by each age class in trying to  get the peanut were very revealing. 
Younger children tried to solve th e problem almost solely by reach ing directly to wards the 
peanut with their hands/fingers . They seem ed stuck on this pa rticular approach and were 
unable to readjust their behavi or even though it failed. The most likely explanation is that it 
simply did not occur to m ost of the child ren to use the  water to solve the task. Many of the 
older ch ildren showed greater co gnitive f lexibility that enabled them  to discard th e 
unsuccessful strategy of reach ing with their hand s or fingers,  which they also attem pted, and 
to search for alternativ e solutions. These childr en were cap able of enlarging their attentional 
focus beyond the tube/peanut to other elem ents present in the room , such as the pitcher of 
water. 
Another important aspect of the children’s prob lem-solving behavior is  that they v erbalized 
their f ailure to solve th e task and addressed the experim enter. That is, children in all age 
classes continually asked the experimenter for help and/or spoke about their inability to solve 
the problem. Although it was not intended by the e xperimenter, the children apparently felt a 
strong social pressure to solve the task. Such  social pressure m ay have suppressed their 
innovative and exploratory be havior, especially a mong the younger subjects. Although this  
problem m ight have been am eliorated if the experimenter had left the room , leaving the 
children alone could have had an analogous detrimental effect by making them wary. 
 
 
General discussion 
 
Even thoug h all subjects seem ed interested in  the reward,  neith er the chim panzees nor the 
gorillas from Leipzig s olved the p roblem in Ex periment 1. Subjects from the two sanctuary 
populations tested in Ex periment 2 were m ore successful: T wo out of 10 orangutan s added 
water to the tube but not enough to get the peanut; 9 out of 24 chimpanzees added water to the 
tube, and 5 of these received the peanut at the end. Control conditions ruled out the hypothesis 
of a general “spitting alacrity,” reg ardless of  its neces sity. The tested  chim panzees added  
water mainly for the purpose of altering the position of the peanut. Experim ent 3 showed that 
introducing a new drinker to the for merly unsuccessful Leipzig chim panzees (Exp. 1) 
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eliminated the differences in perform ance between them and the Ngamba chim panzees (Exp. 
2). We concluded that functional fixedness m ight explain this dispa rity rather than  the f act 
that the Le ipzig ch impanzees h ad rece ived ad ditional exp osure to th e problem  (see a lso 
discussion of Exp. 3). In the last experim ent, we tested human children with an experimental 
setup analogous to that used with the apes.  Age and tes t condition turned out to b e the bes t 
predictors f or success. The older the childr en were, the more like ly they were to f ind the 
appropriate solution to the problem . In addition,  seeing the peanut float seem ed to motivate 
them to use water for the task. 
Several aspects deserve further discussion. Our results from the cont rol conditions (Exp. 2) 
confirmed Mendes et al.’s (2007)  findings obtained with o rangutans: Successful chimpanzees 
spat water into the tube mostly when it af fected the location of the peanut. More importan tly, 
we found that children older than 4 years of ag e and several chim panzees were able to solve 
the problem even without ini tially seeing the peanut float in the tube. Although seeing a 
floating peanut was not strictly necessary for solving the task, children who saw it were m ore 
likely to solve the task. No such facilitation effect was found in chimpanzees, but it is possible 
that the sample size was too small to detect it. 
Data from the test and contro l conditions give credence to the hypothesis that subjects 
established a “cause–effect re lationship” between their action(s)—in this case the ad dition of 
water—and the outco me—in this  case th e incr ease of  the wate r le vel and  th erefore the  
accessibility of the floating reward. And if the cau sal principle of a task is known, insight can 
replace prolonged and dem anding trial-and-error learning (K öhler, 1925). According to 
Visalberghi and Tomasello (1998), there are four different kinds or levels of causal reasoning: 
comprehension, prediction, postdiction, an d production. Strong evidence of causal 
understanding relies especially on the last three aspects, out of which prediction and 
especially production are essential to solving the floating peanut task. 
One of the m ost striking contrasts found in the current study is the difference between 
different groups of the  sa me species. Initiall y, Nga mba chim panzees outperform ed Leipzig 
chimpanzees, but such differences disappeared with the in troduction of a new drink er for the 
Leipzig chimpanzees. The results of Experim ent 3 are consis tent with the idea that functional 
fixedness may have accounted for the initial po or performance of the Leipzig ch impanzees. 
This would m ean that chim panzee problem  s olving, like hum an problem  solving, can be 
affected by functional fixedness. It  is conceivable that functional fixedness, which is assumed 
to be a hum an universal (Germ an & Barrett, 2005), can also be found in chim panzees. In 
contrast, the Leipzig orangutans (Mendes, et al., 2007) did not e xperience the same difficulty 
and all solved the task in the first trial, wh ich suggests that oranguta ns did not experience 
functional fixedness or were able to overcom e it. W hy only chim panzees but not orangutans 
seemed affected by functional fixedness remains an open question. Unexpectedly, none of the 
sanctuary orangutans were able to  solve the task, even though at least two of them spat water 
into the tube. Their failure cannot be attribut ed to functional fixedness because the drinker 
system was  totally new to them . Gorillas al so perform ed poorly; as in the case of the 
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chimpanzees, it is possible th at functional fi xedness con tributed to this outcom e. Future 
studies with larger sam ples (and with som e methodological m odifications) are required to 
draw firmer conclusions on gorillas’ performance in the floating peanut task, which could be a 
useful approach for investigating the infl uence that this and related phenom ena (e.g., 
Einstellung) have on the problem-solving abilities of different species.  
As our current resu lts pooled together with those of Mendes et al. (2007) show, chimpanzees 
and orangutans performed better than 4-year-old children and worse than 6- and 8-year-olds. 
However, caution is requ ired when directly comparing the children’s and  apes’ performances 
in this task, due to the various m ethodological differences between studies. Let us briefly 
review them. Apes received multiple trials, whereas children received only one in total. Given 
that apes succeeded in the first trial or not at  all (with one ex ception), however, this may not 
have been such a critical difference. Another di fference is that water was visually available to 
children but not to apes—except for the orangutans (Exp. 2). Yet, visual access to water did  
not seem to have helped either group much: None of the 10 orangutans solved the task and the 
4-year-old children also perform ed poorly. Even so, it is possible that water visibility paired 
with developed cognitive flexibility may have facilitated solving the task for 6- and 8-year-old 
children. 
Another important difference is that childre n could pour the water from  a pitcher in one 
motion into  the tube whereas ap es were required to spit s everal times to be able to get the 
peanut. The fact that 11 apes in the current study spat water in the tube but only 5 spat enough 
water to retrieve the p eanut sugges ts that m ultiple spittings  (especially if subjects were not 
very skilful at aim ing the wa ter down the tube) m ay have m ade the ta sk pa rticularly 
demanding for apes. We assum e th erefore that this was th e m ain reas on why the re is no  
discrepancy between using the water (pouring) and getting  the peanu t in the children. All 
children who used the pitcher also managed to retrieve the peanut at the end. In contrast, apes 
that had the idea of using water also needed a high am ount of stam ina in order to  get the 
peanut. 
Thus, it is  reason able to assum e that the experimental setup m ight have been m ore 
disadvantageous to the apes than the children. Although a more equivalent design would have 
been desirable, the te sting settings and species’ natural dispositions made this im possible. In 
particular, using mouthfuls of water and water pitchers were impractical for children and apes, 
respectively. And not showing children that wa ter was available nearby (and that they were 
allowed to use it) but providing apes with free access to the drinker also seem ed problematic. 
Consequently, the performance of the apes compared to that of the children should be taken as 
a lower-bound estimate of the former's capacities. Future studies could implem ent procedural 
modifications that would make the ape and human versions of the task more similar, albeit not 
identical. For exam ple, child ren co uld be requi red to  pour multiple cu ps of water from  an  
opaque receptacle with water to solve the task, although the experimenter would still have to 
call attention to the existence of water nearby prior to the test. 
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In conclusion, we found innovative and rem arkable problem-solving abilities in ch impanzees 
and human children. All successful subjects foun d the solution by themselves, and it is worth 
mentioning that chim panzees performed comparably to  4- to 5-year-old  child ren. A lthough 
the cognitive affordances that are crucial for this task are not fully understood, the 
demonstrated behavior can be described as insightful. In addition, we provide tentative 
empirical evidence for functional fixedness in chim panzees—a p henomenon that has  
primarily been described in human psychology literature until now. 
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STUDY II  
 
 
Contrasting the use of causal and arbitrary cues in chimpanzee 
problem solving 
 
 
 
 47
Abstract 
 
In the current experiment, eight chimpanzees were required to detect a b ottle containing juice 
from five opaque bottles of equal shape and size. In the causal condition , the ju ice bottle  
looked identical to the other four bottles bu t was m uch heavier than  the others. In the 
arbitrary condition, the weight of all five bottles was identical, but the juice bottle was color-
marked differently. Because bottle opening was made difficult (and therefore cos tly), th e 
question was whether subjects’ m anipulative behavior would be random  or influenced by the 
nature of the provided infor mation. Our results  show that subjects detected and opened the 
juice bottle significan tly faster when weight (c ausal condition) ra ther than color (arbitra ry 
condition) was the discrim inating cue. We therefore conclude that it seem s more intuitive for 
chimpanzees to infer the content of an object based on its causal prop erties than on purely  
arbitrary regularities.  
 
 
Introduction 
 
Animals can exploit a variety of visual, tactile,  auditory, or olfactory cues to detect the 
presence of food (e.g., Krebs, Davies, & Parr,  1993; McFarland, 1993). However, cues vary 
according to the nature of the relation between their presen ce and the presence of food (Call,  
2006a). W hereas som e are arbitrary relations by virtue of the cues'  covariation with the 
presence of food (e.g., a  light indicates the pres ence of food), others are causal in the sense 
that the cues are dir ectly caused by the presence of the food. Typically, these causal relations 
are grounded on physical laws that govern how objects interact with each other. For instance, 
an object p laced off-center underneath a tray  invariably causes the tray to acqu ire a certain  
slope, or a solid object shaken inside a cup cause s a rattling noise. Both the slope of the tray 
and the ra ttling noise constitute causal cues. Note that such causal cue–outcome relations are 
compulsory, given that it is physically im possible for the in clined tray to have nothing 
underneath it (and for the flat tray to cover th e food item ), or for the noisy container to be 
empty (and for the noiseless one to contain the food). 
Recent studies have shown that great apes can use causal c ues such as the inclin ation of a 
board, the presence of a  hole through which th e food might fall, the noise m ade by a  reward 
inside a shaken cup, or the displacement of a balance beam to infer the presence of food (Call, 
2004, 2006b; Hanus & Call, 2008; Martin-Ordas & Call, 2009). 
At the sam e time, apes were unable to use cues  that bore an arbitrary relation to the reward, 
despite repeated opportunities to use them and despite the close perceptual similarity between 
causal and arbitrary cu es. For instance, sub jects showed n o m ore preference for a wedge 
(displaying the same slope as the inclined board) that covered a hole containing a reward than 
for a flat board that cov ered an em pty hole, ev en after repeated tria ls. Thus, although causal 
and arbitrary cues m ay provide identical perceptual information, they differ crucially in their 
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predictive power and  the infere nces they allow—which is r eflected in the  dif ferent 
performances these cues evoke. 
Exploiting the greater predictive power of causal cues can be particularly advantageous when 
edible parts of an object are not  directly visible and hard to process, for exam ple in heavily  
defended or encased foods (e.g., nuts). For inst ance, both color and weight are two possible 
indicators o f the pres ence of an ed ible kernel  inside a nut. However,  whereas weight has a  
causal relation to the presence of a kernel— a light nut cannot contain an  intact kernel—the 
right color and the pres ence of a kernel are not  causally related, becau se the nut m ight have 
been emptied by some insect. Hanus and Call (2008) focused precisely on the causal–arbitrary 
distinction instantiated by the effect that  the presence of food may have on weight. 
Chimpanzees had to infer the lo cation of food based on th e slope of a beam  (initially at 
equilibrium) after food had been placed in one of two cups balanced on each of its ends. From 
the first trial onwards, subjects preferentially ch ose the cup on the lower side of the balance. 
Crucially, they did not show this  preference in two control tests in whic h the cups were either 
mounted on a fixed inclined ram p m irroring th e position of the cups at the end of the 
experimental trial or in which the e xperimenter (not the re ward) caused the balan ce to tilt in 
one direction. 
Subjects in all of these studies had a relatively passive role, rest ricted to witnessing  an event 
and m aking a choice between two containers. A nother important aspect to address is how 
subjects actively deploy their knowledge about w eight in m ore manipulative tasks, as would 
appear under natural co nditions, where primates are not jus t passive obs ervers. Visalberghi 
and Néel (2003) dem onstrated that two captiv e capuchin monkeys could learn to use the 
sound and/or weight of a nut to infer its content (full or em pty). The authors concluded that 
the m onkeys successfully adapted their percep tion and m odified their behavior in order to  
discriminate full from empty nuts before investing in a costly opening process. However, it is 
unclear whether subjects m ade causal inferences or rather learned to se lect nuts of a certain 
weight, with weight simply bei ng a discrim inative arbi trary stimulus. What is needed is an 
assessment (and a comparison ) of  how quickly subjects w ould solve a com parable problem 
solely grounded on arbitrary relations. 
The goal of the curren t study was to investigat e whether chim panzees were able to tak e 
advantage of a causally structured problem compared to an arbitrary one in a task designed to 
emulate an active foraging situation sim ilar to  that used by Visalberghi and Neel (2003). 
Unlike that study, however, the current study explicitly included two types of cues that varied 
in their relation to  the reward (cau sal vs. arbi trary). In particular, chimpanzees were required  
to find a bottle containing fruit juice from five opaque bottles of equal shape and size. In the 
causal condition, all five bottles looked identical, but the juice bottle was m uch heavier than 
the other four em pty bottles (juice bottle = 520 g, em pty bottles = 20 g). In the arbitrary 
condition, the weight of  all f ive bottles was the s ame, since the other f our bottles were filled 
with the same amount of water; the juice bottle, however, was marked differently (juice bottle 
= white, water bottles = black). In other words,  both conditions provided com pletely reliable 
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cues f or f inding the des ired ju ice bottle, with the crucial d ifference that the ind ication was 
either of a causal  (weight) or  arbitrary nature (color). W e selected weight and color as cues  
because Schrauf and Call (2009) sh owed that apes  were no t more likely to learn o ne better 
than the other when both held an arbitrary (but 100% predictive) relation to the reward. 
Our hypothesis was that if subjects treated caus al inform ation preferentially, they would 
perform bet ter in the causal c ondition (weight) than in the ar bitrary condition (color).  In 
particular, we would expect that  in the  weigh t cond ition, they would  f irst s earch and then  
open the heavy bottle, whereas in the color condition, all bottles would be treated more or less 
identically (with a random  opening order). If subjects only  for med associative con nections 
between certain features and outcomes during th e course of the experim ent, neither condition 
should differ with regards to the subjects’ opening preferences.   
 
 
Method 
 
Subjects  
We tested eight chimpanzees (four males, four females) with ages estimated between 6 and 10 
years (mean = 8.25, SD = 1.09). All chim panzees were wild-born, orphaned at a young age, 
and rescued and sent to the Ngam ba Island Sanc tuary, Uganda, where they liv ed in a social 
group at the tim e of testing. Alt hough subjects had participated in other cognitive tasks prior 
to the current study, none of these tasks involved color or weight discrimination. All subjects 
were tested individually and were never deprived of food or water. 
 
Materials 
Five identical 500-m l plastic Coca-Cola bottle s with  the ir corr esponding lids served as 
stimuli.  They were rendered opaque by being wrapped with grey duct  tape.   Bottles were  
filled with eithe r s trawberry juic e, water,  o r lef t em pty, depending on the exp erimental 
condition. During the test preparation phase, we  presented the bottles on a wooden platform 
(100 cm x 40 cm ) in front of the su bject.  During the test m anipulation phase, we placed the 
bottles in an opaque plastic repository that c overed the bottom part of each bottle (see Figure 
1). This made the salience of the cues in the two test conditions (weight and color; see below) 
more comparable because subjects could not se e any difference between  the five bottles until 
they had lifted them. 
 
Procedure 
Pretest:  Prior to the tes t, we asses sed whether chimpanzees preferred juice when g iven the 
choice b etween (a) the sam e am ount of juice and water or (b ) juice and nothing/air.  W e 
presented subjects with two transpa rent bottles, one filled with juice and the o ther one either 
empty (four trials), or filled with water (four tr ials). We administered trials of both conditions 
in an alternating fashion (e.g., juice vs. empty => juice vs. water => juice vs. empty => and so 
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forth). Only those subjects who chose the juice over the water or  the empty bottle  in the las t 
two trials advanced to the test.6 
Test: Each test trial consisted of a preparation phase and a subsequent manipulation phase.  
During the preparation phase, the experim enter (E) sat facing the subject, separated by m esh, 
with five opaque bottles resti ng on a platform  between them. All bottles were  initially op en, 
and E turned them  upside-down so that the s ubjects could  see that they  were em pty. There 
were two conditions: weight and color.  In the preparation phase of the  weight condition, E 
filled one of the bottles with juice, leaving the f our remaining ones empty. In the preparation 
phase of the color condition, E filled one bottle with juice and the four rem aining ones with  
water. Bottles were f illed up to the top in order to avoid auditory cues  when shaken.  The 
juice was always poured into the firs t bottle on the left. After filling the bottles, E screwed on 
their lids and sealed them with adhesive tape to  make them harder (and hence more costly) to 
open. Then E placed all bottles in a bucket and  took them  to a neighboring room  out of the  
subject’s view. Crucially, up until this m oment subjects had witnessed th e entire preparation 
procedure. 
After this the manipulation phase began. In the weight condition, E lined up all five bottles in 
a repos itory (see F igure 1) inside  the testi ng room , with the pos ition of  the ju ice bottle 
randomized and counterbalanced across trials. In  the color condition, E labeled the lower part 
of the bottles with different colors before placing them in the repository.  The juice bottle was 
labeled with a white mark and the four water bottles with a black mark. In both conditions, all 
bottles were doused with some juice in order to preclude any gustatory or smell cue. 
At that point the subject was allowe d to enter the testing room. W e coded the order in which 
the subject opened or tried to open the bottles to gain acces s to their co ntents. Both actually 
opening the bottles (i.e., successfully removing the lids) and attempting to destroy the bottles’ 
opaque coating in order to visually verify the contents were coded as "opened." 
Subjects received both conditions successiv ely ( 15 trials p er condition ) with the order of 
presentation counterbalanced across subjects. Group 1 (four subjects ) started with 15 trials of 
the weigh t condition followed by 15 trials  of the color condition,  whereas  grou p 2 (fou r 
subjects) received them in the oppo site order. All subjects recei ved only two trials per day,  
resulting in 8 testing days per condition and 16 testing days in total. There was always a one-
day break before conditions were swapped. 
 
 
6 Only one subject from the original test po pulation had to be excluded because she did not fu lfill the pretest 
criteria. 
 Figure 1: Plastic repository in which the five b ottles were p laced. Only the top half of each bottle was 
visible. A) Weight condition: position of the one juice bottle (heavy) and the four empty bottles (light) was 
randomized and co unterbalanced a cross sessio ns. B)  Co lor con dition: position of th e on e j uice bo ttle 
(white) and the four water bottles (black) was randomized and counterbalanced across sessions. 
 
 
Results 
 
If subjects treated the b ottles randomly, the ju ice bottle should be opene d third on average. 
Within the first testing block (Trials 1–15), subjects in the weight condition (Group 1) opened 
the juice bottle significantly earlier than would be expected by chance (Mann-W hitney exact 
test: U = 0, nweight = 4, nchance = 4, p = 0.029, two-tailed). In contrast , the subjects in the color 
condition (Group 2) opened the bottles in an orde r that did not differ from chance expectation 
(Mann-Whitney exact test: U = 8, ncolor = 4, nchance = 4, p = 1.000, two-tailed). Furthermore, a 
nonparametric test revealed a statistical trend concerning the difference in opening 
preferences between subjects from the wei ght group and subjects f rom the color group 
(Mann-Whitney exact test: U = 1, nweight = 4, ncolor = 4, p = 0.057, two-tailed). On average, 
subjects from the weight group opened the jui ce bottle earlier than su bjects from the color 
group did (average opening positio n "weight" = 1.90; average openin g position "color" =  
2.93).  
After the first testing block, conditions were swapped betw een groups, which allowed a 
within-subject com parison. A nonparam etric test  revealed a significan t difference between 
subjects’ op ening preferences in th e weight condition and their opening preferences in the 
 51
color condition (W ilcoxon exact test: T+ = 8, n = 8, p = 0.008, two-tailed).  All subjects who 
received the color condition second (Group 1) op ened the juice bottle in  that condition later 
than in the previous weight condition, whereas subjects who received the weight condition 
second (Group 2) opened the juice bottle in that condition faster than in the previous color 
condition (average open ing position  "weight " =  1.79; average opening position "co lor" =  
3.03; see Figure 2). 
 
 
Figure 2 : Avera ge op ening order o f th e ju ice bo ttle fo r ea ch su bject across a ll 15  tria ls. Gra y ba rs 
represent sub jects’ p erformance in  t he co lor co ndition (a rbitrary cue) ; b lack b ars rep resent the 
performance in the weight condition (causal cue). The dashed line indicates a random opening order. 
 
Over the course of the experi ment, subjects’ performance improved remarkably during the 15 
trials of the weight cond ition, but did not chan ge during th e 15 trials of the colo r condition 
(see Figure 3). In the weight condition, subjects opened the juice bottle on average in position 
2.4 at the beginning (Trials 1–5) and  in position 1.2 at the end of the experim ent (Trials 11–
15). In the color condition, subjects  opened the juice bo ttle on average in position 2 .7 at th e 
beginning and in position 3.3 at the end of the experim ent. A nonparam etric comparison of  
subjects’ performances during the first f ive testing tr ials with  their perform ances during the 
last five testing trials reveal ed a significant im provement over time in the weight condition 
(Wilcoxon exact test: T+ = 8, n = 8, p = 0.008, two-tailed) but not  in the color condition 
(Wilcoxon exact test: T+ = 5, n = 8, p = 0.195, two-tailed).  
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 Figure 3: Average opening order of the juice bottle across all subjects. Gray circles rep resent subjects' 
performance i n the color c ondition (ar bitrary cue) ; black squares re present the pe rformance in the 
weight condition (causal cue) for each trial. The dashed line indicates a random opening order. 
 
Both the  between-sub ject and  the with in-subject com parison sugge st that subje cts 
manipulated and finally opened the juice bottle significantly faster/earlier when a causal cue 
(weight) indicated the content of  the bottles, whereas their openi ng behavior was no different 
from chance when an arbitrary cue (color) was the only inform ation available. Although 
immediate learning took  place in the causal cond ition, the same individuals were not able to  
benefit from their 15-trials experience in the arbitrary condition.  
 
 
Discussion 
 
During their first few exposures to the problem , all subjects opened  the bottles 
indiscriminately in both conditions. In the we ight condition, subjects rapidly learned to open 
the heavy b ottle before the ligh t bottles, but the  same individuals were not able to learn an 
association between color and reward during the c ourse of the experiment (15 trials). It is 
important to remember that in the g iven scenario, both types of cues —causal and arbitrary—
provided the sam e predictive v alue, because the cue–outcome relation was totally reliable in  
both cases. Nevertheless, for chimpanzees it seemed more intuitive to infer the content of an 
object causally (in this case, heavy => food) than  when given a cue of ar bitrary regularity (in 
this case, white => food).  
Could it be that som e kinds of  cues (e.g., weight) per se im ply a higher predictive value 
towards a possible outcom e than others?  We do not think the physical feature itself induces 
that difference (e.g., that weight is  always more salient than color). Instead, we suggest that it 
strongly depends on the context in which cues are and are not preferab ly used by anim als. 
Schrauf and Call’s study (2009) suppor ts this view. In stark contrast to the current study, they 
did not find a predom inance of the feature weight over color when ex plicitly prov iding a  
noncausal context in which both weight and color cues were presented as arbitrary stimuli. In 
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a totally arb itrary exchange sett ing, weight and color cues seem ed equally easy or hard to 
learn for the tested bonobos, gorilla s, and orangutans. In fact, s ubjects even learned the color 
discrimination slightly faster than the weight discrimination. These findings, however, concur 
with our major contention. In the given context,  neither of the cues was of a compulsory 
causal nature; hence, there was no reason to prefer one cue to the other. 
On the basis of previous and current data, we postulate that chimpanzees (and probably other 
animals as well) assess causally structured stimulus relations in a fundamentally different way 
than when assess ing p urely arbitrary stim ulus associatio ns. In o ther words, chimpanzees’ 
cognitive systems seem naturally built to benefit from causal structures; when confronted with 
problems containing purely arbitrar y relations, they have to r ely on a costly general learning 
mechanism. Even thou gh associative learning  theory has  enhanced  and recon sidered its  
premises during th e last decades (Resco rla & Wagner, 1972; Van Hamme & W asserman, 
1994), it has yet to explain satisfactorily why the predictive power of certain stim ulus 
associations is so context dependent (see also Blaisdell, K osuke, & Waldm ann, 2005 for a 
related discussion).  
In the following, we address som e potential po ints of m ethodological cr iticism. Given that  
during the p reparation phase, the f irst bottle on the lef t was always f illed with juice  and the 
other four were either left em pty (weight condition) or filled with water (color condition), the 
question arises as to w hether this procedural  characteristic som ehow influenced subjects’ 
opening behavior in the subsequent m anipulation phase. Our data suggest that it did not. In 
the causal condition, subjects did not show any obvious opening preference based on the 
bottle’s location within the repository. Apparently, their manipulative behavior was guided by 
causal reasoning rather than a sim ple sequential ‘one-after-the-other’ searching approach. In 
the arb itrary condition,  subjects s eemed to pr efer to m anipulate the  bottle s in a serial 
fashion—starting in the repository either with Bottle 1 (far left) or with Bottle 5 (far righ t). 
However, in spite of  having always seen Bottle  1 f illed with juice in th e preparation phase,  
subjects seemed to prefer to start manipulating Bottle 5 (41 % of all cases) rather than Bottle 1 
(29 % of all cases). This sugge sts that they did not transfer  any inform ation about bottle 
position from the preparation phase to the manipulation phase.  
Some may wonder why chim panzees could  not le arn the g iven color–reward association in  
the arbitrary condition. The fact that subjects failed to learn this arbitrary regularity during the 
15 trials of this study is not su rprising and is in accordance with previo us data (e.g. , Call,  
2006b; Hanus & Call,  2008). Chimpanzees certainly have the capacity to learn such arbitrary 
continuities—when given (m uch) more experi ence. Grasp ing the caus al log ic of the given  
problem on the other hand seemed comparatively easy for our subjects.  
Where this “preparedness” for causal inferenc es derives from  remains an open question. On 
the basis of the current data, we cannot determ ine whether or not this is an inherent ability, 
like som e kind of core knowledge (e.g., Carey & Spelke, 1996), or whet her it is a purely 
learned competence (e.g., Dickinson & Sha nks, 1985; Heyes & Dickinson, 1990). Perhaps 
both com ponents are important. R ecurrent expe rience during ontogeny de finitely plays an  
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important role in the acquisition of such c ognitive skills––in hum an and nonhum an primates 
alike. Indiv iduals need to interact repeated ly with various causal re gularities within the ir 
physical world in order to be capable of transferring this specific knowledge to new situations. 
Such cognitive transfer is essential for de aling m ore efficiently with future problem s 
(Waldmann, et al., 2006). In addition, it seems plausible from an evolutionary perspective that 
animals facing a com plex and quickly changing  environment would profit from  a cognitive 
predisposition that enab les them to learn causa l relations more quick ly and read ily than any  
other kind of stimulus associations. 
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STUDY III 
 
 
Chimpanzees infer the location of a reward on the basis of the 
effect of its weight 
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Original article 
 
The extent to which anim als in general, and non-human prim ates in particular, understand 
physical causality is currently  unclear [1,2]. One way to assess an anim al’s causal 
understanding is to test its ability to analyze a causal chain backwards—to infer cause from an 
effect [3]. In the study reported here, chim panzees saw a given outcome (effect) of an action 
and had to infer the preceding even t (cause) in order to solve the prob lem. More specifically, 
subjects saw a banana being hidden inside one  of two opaque cups mounted on opposite sides 
of a balanced beam , but they were kept ig norant about the banana’s exact location. 
Subsequently, the subjects w itnessed the ba lance beam  tilting to  one side af ter the  
experimenter released it from its equilib rium position (the Balance condition). The 
chimpanzees preferentially (and fro m trial one) selected th e lower, compared to the upper, 
cup. Two control conditions dem onstrated that the chim panzee subjects lacked an intrinsic 
preference for the lower cup when there was no movement involved (the Wedge condition) or 
when the b alance b eam was tilte d by the ex perimenter’s action  (th e Non-causal balance  
condition). We conclud e that the chim panzee subjects of  our exp eriments de monstrated 
evidence of causal inference based on an object’s weight. In our experim ents, the chimpanzee 
subjects selected the baited cup significantly above chance in the Balance condition (see the 
Supplemental data available on- line for details). W e compared the Balance condition to two 
control conditions. In the W edge condition, th e cups were m ounted on opposite sides of a  
fixed ramp so that they sim ulated the position of the cups in the titled balance pos ition. This 
condition allowed us to assess wh ether subjects simply showed an intrinsic preference for the 
bottom cup. The subjects perform ed significantly better in the Balance condition than in the 
Wedge condition. Analyzing the f irst trial pe rformance confirm ed this result. A ll eight 
subjects in the Balance conditi on selected the bottom  cup, but onl y four out of eight subjects 
did so in the W edge condition. It  is remarkable that for subject s that began with the Balance 
condition (group 1), a comparison between the last Balance-block with the first Wedge- block 
revealed that they s ignificantly decreased th eir performance by 30% (Fi gure 1). In contrast, 
subjects that began with the W edge conditi on (group 2) significantly im proved their 
performance by 18% when com paring the last Wedge-block to the first Balance-block. We  
tested the Non-causal balance con trol condition on a new group of subjects. In this condition 
subjects witnessed the sam e bea m move ment as in the Balance condition, except that the  
movement was caused by the experimenter pushing down the balance beam, not by the weight 
of the reward. This cond ition allowed us to  assess whether subjects simply preferred the cup  
that followed a downward trajectory independe ntly of  its  cau se. Subjects perform ed 
significantly bette r in th e Balance than in th e Non-causal balance condition (Figure 2). In 
general, there was no si gnificant improvement in performance across blocks of trials within 
any of the three cond itions. Our results suggest that chim panzees inferred the location of the  
reward based on the m ovement and the resultan t final position of the balance on which the  
cups were mounted. This result w as not due to an intrinsic preference for the bottom  cup, 
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because subjects lacked such a preference in the first trial of the Wedge condition. Arguably, 
subjects may have been particularly attracted by  falling (rather than raising) trajectories, as 
shown for cotton- top tamarins and human infants younger than 2.5 years of age [4,5]. We can 
rule out that explanation, however, because subjects did not show such preference in the Non-
causal balance condition. Therefore, it is con ceivable that subjects selected the bottom cup 
because they inferred th at the presence of the reward, and its weight in particular, c aused the 
balance to tilt. These d ata support the notion that chimpanzees more easily solve tasks whose 
elements hold a causal rather th an an arbitrary relation [2,6]. Subjects’ flawless perf ormance 
in the first trial ruled ou t the po ssibility that they learned to respond in this way du ring the 
course of the experim ent. Furthermore, the chimpanzee subjects that receiv ed the W edge 
condition first increased their perform ance wh en confronted with the Balance condition, 
whereas the subjects that were tested with  the Balance condition first decreased their 
subsequent perform ance upon enco untering th e W edge condition. T his shows that the 
chimpanzee subjects clearly  detected the difference between the two conditio ns. More 
importantly, these results m ake a ‘choosing the lower cup’ heuristic untenable, because once 
the subjects were already choosing the bottom  cup in the Balance condition, it is unclear why 
they would decrease th eir preference for the bottom cup dr astically in the f ollowing Wedge 
condition. A typical approach to investigating causal understanding in non-human animals is 
to test their ability to an ticipate the effect that their own action will have on certain elem ents 
of the physical world. If they understand the underlying causal princi ple then they are 
expected to act accordin gly towards a wanted  outcome—in most cases, access to food [3,7]. 
In general, tool-using behavior  is  a  typic al exa mple f or th e ‘productive’ asp ect in  causal 
reasoning. According to the definition of Visalb erghi and Tomasello [7], ‘comprehensive’ or 
‘postdictive’ abilities can be postulated when subjects solve a problem by inferring the 
preceding event (the cause), on th e basis of a given outco me (the effect). W e argue that the 
current study revealed evidence th at chimpanzees can engage in the ‘co mprehensive’ aspect 
of causal reasoning with regard to object weight. Further research is needed to clarify whether 
such basic com prehensive asp ect of causal reason ing represents  a precu rsor of m ore 
sophisticated forms of physical reasoning found in adults involving abstract concepts such as 
gravity. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 
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Figure 2 
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Supplemental data 
 
 
Experimental methods 
 
Subjects 
We tested 16 chimpanzees (10 males, 6 females) with ages estimated between 4 and 10 years  
(mean = 7.06, SD = 1.81) in the Ba lance and th e Wedge condition.  In a ddition we tested 8  
new subjects ( mean age = 18.75, SD = 2.44) in the Non-causal  balance condition. All 
chimpanzees were housed in a social group at th e Ngamba Island Sanctuary, Uganda. Prior to 
this experiment, subjects had not experienced any test similar to this. All subjects were tested 
individually and were never food or water deprived. 
 
Materials 
There were two apparatuses. The balance ap paratus consisted of a wooden board (70 c m 
length, 10 cm  width) whose m idpoint rested on the vertex of a wooden triangle (20 cm 
height). An opaque cup (15 cm height, 10 cm  diam eter) was m ounted on each end of the 
board. The cups were cut vertically in half with the open side facing towards the experimenter 
so that he could see and reach into the cups, whereas the subject’s view was blocked.  
The non-causal balance apparatus wa s the same that we used in the Balance condition except 
that a p iece of rubber impeded its free m ovement so that th e weight of the food alo ne could 
not tilt it to one side af ter the baitin g. Instead E caused the balance bea m to tilt by applyin g 
external force to it.  
The wedge apparatus consisted of a fixed incl ined wooden board with one cup m ounted on 
each of its sides. The board inclination, the cups , and their position were identical to those of 
the balance apparatus in its tilted position (see a small drawing within figure 1 + 2). A banana 
slice (2-3 cm in length, weight = 20-30 g) was used as reward in each trial. 
 
Procedure 
The experimenter sat facing the subject separated by mesh and with the apparatus resting on a 
platform between them. Prior to each trial both cups were lifted so that the subjects could see 
them empty at the beginning. There were two conditions: Balance and Wedge. In the Balance 
condition the experim enter showed the reward to the subject and hid it outside of subjects 
view in one of his hands (inside the fist). Then – while looking straight ahead – E moved both 
hands simultaneously to each end o f the apparatu s, thereby baiting one of the cups with the 
banana. At this point the subject knew that the reward was in one of the cups but did not know 
in which one. After the baiting was completed, E raised his empty hands so that the weight of 
the reward tilted the balance. Subjects were then allowed to select one of the cups by touching 
it and imm ediately received the content of the in dicated cup. If subjects picked the lower (=  
baited) cup they received the food reward, if subjects picked the upper (= em pty) cup they 
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received nothing. Trials were repeated when s ubjects touched both cups at the same tim e. In 
the Wedge condition, the experim enter followed th e same steps as in the Balance condition 
except th at the balan ce beam  was replaced by a slanted s urface. Here no m ovement was 
involved. The reward w as always placed inside the cup that either m oved down (balance) o r 
was at the lower positio n (wedge). Food location was counterbalanced  with the food never 
placed more than two times in a row on the same side.  
Subjects received bo th conditions successively (32 trials per condition) with o rder of  
presentation counterbalanced ac ross subjects. G roup 1 (8 subject s) started with the Balance 
condition followed by  the W edge condition,  whereas  group 2 (8  subjects) receiv ed the two  
conditions in the opposite o rder. A ll sub jects received  10-11 trials p er session and day,  
resulting in 3 testing days per condition. For statistical analyses we split the 32 trials for each 
condition into two 16-trial blocks . We com pared the percent of correct selections (choice of  
the lower side) as a function of condition and bloc k, including those in the first trial. W e also 
investigated the changes  in performance after changing conditions by comparing the last and 
first block of successive conditions. After testing those two groups of subjects we presented a 
third group of subjects the Noncausal balan ce condition. The procedure was exactly the sam e 
as in the original Balance condi tion except that after the baiti ng was completed the weight of 
the reward did not tilt the balance. Instead the balanc e rem ained stable until, af ter 3-5 
seconds, E placed bo th hands on th e beam (lef t and righ t from the angle point) and  pushed 
one side downwards. Subjects were then allowe d to select one of the cups by touching it and 
immediately received the content of the indicated cup.  
Inter-trial intervals were approxim ately 10-30 seconds for each co ndition, dep ending on  
individual’s participation. 
 
 
Analysis details 
 
An one-sample t-test (with 50% as chance level) revealed that subjects selected the baited cup 
significantly above chance in  the balance condition ( t(7) = 11.18, p < .001) but not in the 
wedge ( t(7) = 2.29, p > .05) or the non-causal balance con dition ( t(7) = 1.32, p > .05). An 
ANOVA on the percentage of correct trials with condition and testing block as within-subject 
factors and  order as between-sub ject factor showed that subjects perform ed si gnificantly 
better in the Balance than  in the Wedge condition (F1,14 = 29.47, p < .001). No other factors 
or interactions were significan t (p > .09). Afte r including the new subjects (group 3) that 
received only the Non-causal balance conditi on we run an ANOVA on the percentage of 
correct tr ials with testing block as within-s ubjects factor and cond ition as between-subject 
factor. To com pare the three grou ps we analy zed only their f irst 32  trials. Sub jects that 
received the Balance condition performed significantly better than subjects in the Wedge or in 
the Non-causal balance condition ( F2,21 = 12.24, p < .001; Bonferro ni post-hoc tests p < 
.005), whereas there was no signifi cant different in perform ance between the W edge and the 
Non-causal balance (Bonferroni post-hoc test p = 1.0).  
Focusing on the first trial, a between group comparison confirmed that subjects in the Balance 
condition performed significantly better than those in the contro l conditions (Fisher’s exact 
test p = .027). A Binom ial test revealed that subjects in the Balan ce condition selected the 
bottom cup above chance levels (p = .008; 8 out of 8 subjects). In contrast, only 4 and 3 (out 
of 8 subjects) selected the correct cup in the Wedge (p = 1) and the Non-causal balance 
conditions (p = .727), respectively.  
Using a paired sam ple t-test we compared the performance in the last balance-block with the 
first wedge-block of group 1. They significan tly decreased their perform ance by 30% ( t(7) = 
4.33, p = .003). For group 2, which began with  the W edge condition, subjects perf ormance 
significantly im proved by 18% when com paring th e la st wedge-bloc k to the f irst balan ce-
block (t(7) = 2.90, p = .023). 
 
 
Figure S1: BALANCE-Apparatus 
 
 
 
Figure S2: WEDGE-Apparatus 
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GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
 
Study summaries 
 
Using different experim ental paradigm s, all three studies underlying this thesis provided 
empirical evidence for the claim that nonhum an primates take causal inform ation into 
consideration when dealing with object–object relations. Chimpanzees seem to appreciate that 
the specific physical properties of objects dict ate possible (and im possible) ways of their 
interaction. Altogether, all th ree essential com ponents of causal reasoning as postulated by 
Visalberghi and Tomasello (1998) could be successfully verified in chimpanzees.  
 
STUDY I  demonstrated problem -solving abilities in chim panzees and h uman children on a 
level that cannot be explained by trial-and-error learning. The way subjects m anaged to find 
an innovative solution without any external help  (e.g., training, social dem onstration) fulfils 
all criteria of insightful beha vior (Köhler, 1925; Thorpe, 1956). ). In contrast to all other 
known examples of tool-using behavior in ma mmals and birds a liquid substrate (water) 
served as a tool in th e present case. This is particularly remarkable because, accord ing to all 
available field res earch data, no great ap e sp ecies functionally uses  water in the wild. 
Furthermore, STUDY I  (Exp. 3) pro vided em pirical i ndications that chimpanzee problem -
solving abilities might be affected b y a facto r that is known to influen ce human cognition as 
well, namely the psychological phenomenon of functional fixedness.  
This is not to say that all successful chim panzees in itially understoo d and predicted the 
floating capacity of a shelled nut . In my view, the cu rrent results do no t jus tify such a rich  
interpretation. Instead, subjects may have simply identified potential candidates for promising 
solutions and then examined their functionality. Even if this were the case, generating an idea 
about a potential solution is no t a trivial act. It  requires anticipatin g how the given (or 
imagined) objects m ight causally interact with o ne another. In other words, subjects have to 
think through a problem in order to evaluate the impact of potential behavioral alternatives—
an ability that has been referred to as mental rehearsal (Dunbar, 2000; Dunbar, McAda m, & 
O'Connell, 2005). Such m ental rehearsal could th erefore be seen as a precondition for every 
flexible tool-use, because it f acilitates identifying the suitable  objects among a ll perceptually 
available alternatives. Furtherm ore, I argue that such  m ental re hearsal is virtu ally 
indispensable when the potential tool itself (e.g., water) is not even perceptually available—as 
in the cas e of STUDY I , where the chim panzee subjects co uld not see any water u nless they 
pressed the drinking device. Ag ain, it should be em phasized th at I am  not claim ing that 
subjects fully anticipated the ex act sequence of  events from  scratch; they m ay have browsed 
through all available possibilities, including thos e that were perceptually available. Yet, 
remarkably, these possibilities also included those that were only av ailable as  a m ental 
representation.  
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Out of the different aspect s of m anifestation (Visal berghi & Tom asello, 1998), STUDY I  
clearly verified "produ ctive" caus al com petences in ch impanzees. Subjects correctly  
anticipated the potential effect of their own action and acted according ly to bring about the 
desired outcome.   
 
Unlike in the first study, subjects in STUDY II  were not required to produce a particular 
outcome actively but instead ha d to infer the content of ob jects based on certain physical 
features (w eight or co lor). Resu lts strongly suggested that chim panzees are capable of 
processing a "predictive" inference—anot her im portant aspect of causal reasoning 
(Visalberghi & Tom asello, 1998)—given th at s ubjects successfully  inferred the curren t 
location of food (the effect) based on a prev iously observed fillin g event (the cause). 
Importantly, subjects su cceeded only when the relation between the perceiv ed property and 
reward was causal, not when it was arbitrary. Whereas the weight cue already seemed to help 
the subjects  to forage more effectively after v ery few trials, the color cue did not influence 
their searching behavior within the given time frame.  
In STUDY I, subjects were actively e ngaged in the problem -solving process because they had 
to produce an innovative solu tion to the given problem . STUDY II  (albeit to a lesse r extent) 
also required individuals to physic ally interact with the objects in the ta sk. In other words, 
subjects had to actively do something in both cases, and performance depended on the correct 
causal assessment of the situation.  
One rem aining question  was how crucia l this bodily engagem ent was for subjects'  causal 
understanding of a problem. It has been argued that true causal  reasoning involves an abstract 
component that enables indivi duals to exploit causal relati ons even when they are not 
necessarily related to the ag ent’s own causal power (Berm udez, 2006; Call & Tom asello, 
2005; Gopnik, et al., 2 004). In addition, such  an abstract for m of ca usal reasoning would 
allow an organism  to analyze a causal chain b ackwards, that is, to reason from  an existen t 
effect to the preceding cause. According to Visalberghi and Tomasello’s (1998) classification, 
this ability would reflect the last m issing key aspect of caus al reasoning—the capacity for 
"postdiction." W hereas som e authors em phasize the com monalities between hu man and 
nonhuman causal cognition in that respect (Blaisdell, et al., 2006; Call, 2006a; Hauser, 2001), 
others have argued that the ability to anal yze backwards represents a genuinely hum an 
competence (Povinelli & Dunphy-Lelii, 2001; Reboul, 2005; Vonk, 2005). 
Finally, STUD Y II I targeted the question of whether ap es are capable of  detec ting a causal 
regularity that is detached fr om one’s own personal action, by passively perceiving external 
events. Here, causal reasoning about the sam e physical dom ain as in STUDY I I was 
investigated, namely weight—this time, however, without any active physical engagement of 
the subject itself. The current data suggest that—analogue to STUDY II—chimpanzees perform 
correctly when the s ituation allows  for causal judgments but fail to ma ke useful inferences 
when the underlying logic is of an arbitrar y kind. Rem arkably, subjec ts' behavior differed 
totally in ex perimental conditions that were per ceptually very similar yet concep tually very  
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distinct. Whereas chimpanzees were able to a ppreciate a giv en causal cu e from the first trial 
on, they continuously failed to benefit from  a purely correlative conjunction of al most 
identical-looking even ts during 32  trials.  I conclude that chim panzees show convincin g 
evidence for postdictive reasoning, given that they readily inferred the antecedent event (food  
placement) based on the consequent event (causal movement of the balance). In addition, this 
study showed that chimpanzees'  causal reason ing does not necessarily depend on their own  
agency, m eaning th at they can ex ploit extern al cau sal in formation p urely on  th e basis  of 
passive observations.  
 
 
Ontogenetic origins of causal cognition 
 
The focus of this thesis was on verifying nonhuman understanding of causal properties and 
causal reasoning within the physical dom ain, and thus on investigating nonhum an primates' 
present competencies. A resultant question—that was not addressed by this work—concerns 
the ontogenetic developm ent of causal cognition in hum an and nonhum an minds. Coherent  
data on apes’ cognitive developm ent in the phys ical domain is rare (but see Antinucci, 1990;  
Czeschlik, 1998; Hauser, et al., 2002; Matsuzawa, 2007). The main reason for this deficit lies 
in the small sample sizes typically involved in ape cognition research. Because that limitation 
also affected the curren t studies, I refrained fro m any analyses of age or gender effects in the 
tested ape populations. Future s tudies or meta-analyses of several experiments will hopefully 
fill the g ap and p rovide new in sights into  the cognitive ontogeny of  our closest liv ing 
relatives. 
Much more input on the potential roots of causal understanding com es from developmental 
psychology, more precisely from  human infant  research. H ere, many authors em phasize the 
importance of innate predispos ition for infants’ acquisiti on of knowledge (Keil, 1998). 
Whereas for some researchers, pre-existing core  beliefs are essential (Carey & Spelke, 1996; 
Spelke, 2000; Spelke, et al., 1992) , others argue for an innate se t of principles that enable 
infants to recognize b asic typ es of intera ctions between objects (Baillargeon,  1994;  
Baillargeon, 2004a). All of the m point out that  only genetic aspects of causal cogn ition can 
explain existing competences in inf ants, who obviously lack sufficient experience of object–
object relations (see also Introduction).  
Piaget reports the interesting observation th at young children describe physical phenom ena 
(e.g., waves on a lake) as living and conscious entities (P iaget, 1930). Anothe r explanatory 
source for child ren to  m ake sense of why things happen are social norm s or "m oral 
necessities," as h e phrased it. For Piaget,  the perm anent confusi on between psychological 
activity and physical m echanisms is typical of children’s precausal phase; others have 
emphasized m ultiple p athways of developm ent for physical, psycholo gical, and b iological 
domains (e.g., Inagaki & Hatano, 2002) or even suggested that  the notion of psychological 
causality might precede purely phy sical causa l understand ing (Premack & Prem ack, 1994). 
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Coming from a different angle, some psychologis ts observed that children start using social 
and nonsocial tools at about the sam e time (Bates, Camaioni, & Volterra, 1975; Bretherton & 
Bates, 1979). Because child ren co ntinuously experien ce th eir own impact on oth er hum an 
beings (e.g., parents, caregive rs) as well as on objects, th ey begin to for m (and test) 
hypotheses of causation in the anim ate and inanimate world at a fairly early age (Bretherton, 
McNew, & Beeghly-Smith, 1980; Gopnik & Meltzoff, 1997).  
More recently, researchers have focused on th e fact that child ren (an d perhaps anim als) 
unconsciously construct causal structures—so-called causal maps —that are based on 
observations as well as in terventions (Gopnik, et al., 2004;  Gopnik & Schulz, 2007). The 
main idea is that thos e learn ing m echanisms can be described with the m athematical 
formalism of directed graphi cal models such as Bayes ne ts. Analogue to spatial m aps 
(Campell, 1995), causal m aps al low for none gocentric causal representations of the  
environment, an essential ability for predic ting causal consequences that do not involve 
personal agency (e.g., STUDY II I). Furtherm ore, such caus al m aps enable the individual to 
extend its existing causal knowledge to new contexts . Crucially, such transfer is not restricted 
to stim uli r elations th at resu lt im mediately from individuals’ own action (as in operant 
conditioning and trial-and-error learning ) or  ones that necessarily involve reward o r 
punishment (as in classical and operant conditioning; Gopnik, et. al., 2004). 
 
 
Associative learning and causal reasoning 
 
When it comes to the question of underly ing mechanisms in causal cognition, several authors 
have proposed associative learni ng as the m ost parsimonious and evolutionarily conservative 
explanation (Castro & W assermann, 2005; Dickinson & Shanks, 1995; Heyes, 2000; 
Macphail & Barlow, 1985). Dennett (1983) boiled it down to the bold claim  that behaviorism 
is the null hypothesis against wh ich cognitive accounts have to be tested. Although scientific 
advocates of associative learning theory differ on certain aspect s (e.g., its specific importance 
for com plex hum an cognition ), th ey share th e implicit n otion th at c lassical and  operan t 
conditioning constitute fundamental and primordial processes upon which all higher cognition 
is built. Several authors have em phasized th e drawback of such an  exclusive dichotomy 
between simple association and com plex c ognition (Allen, 2006; Berm udez, 2003; Seed & 
Call, 2009).  Nonetheles s, the d ichotomy still seems to prevail when anim als' cognitive 
performances are interpreted (e.g., Castro  & Wasserm ann, 2005; Davidson, 1982; W ynne, 
2001). As a reaction to the challeng es of recen t experimental findings, classical behav iorism 
(Pawlow, 1926/2006; Skinner, 1938/1966; Thorndi ke, 1911/2000) has changed substantially 
since its original conception (T imberlake & Lucas, 1989). New concepts such as secondary 
reinforcement, bidirectional association , or backward blocking  were introduced to enhance 
original learning theories (see Arcediano, Es cobar, & Miller, 2005; Frank & W asserman, 
2005; Mackintosh, 1983; Papineau & Heyes, 2 006; Rescorla & W agner, 1972; Sutherland & 
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Mackintosh, 1971; Van Ha mme & W asserman, 1994) . Upgrading scientif ic theories as a 
reaction to inconsistent em pirical data is an el igible practice and the gen uine driving force of 
science (Popper, 1935/1998). However, in the present debate, it remains questionable whether 
the in itial claim  of explanato ry p arsimony is still fulfilled, because in ord er to rem ain 
congruent with the experim ental findings, associative explan ations often have to im ply 
enormous complex preconditions (Zentall, 1993).  
Nonetheless, few would doubt that from  an evol utionary perspective, associative learning is 
an extremely useful mechanism that is wi despread among the animal kingdom; by no m eans 
am I denying the im portance of  classical and  operant co nditioning f or anim al and hum an 
learning. What I instead question here is sim ply the doctrine of  associative learning as the 
general underly ing basic process o f all other (higher) co gnition. In stead, I prop ose that 
animals as well as  hu mans m ight associate p erceptual regularities w hen no other (causal) 
information is available. As stated by A llen (2006, p. 179), “[in a S kinner-Box setting,] 
experimenter-imposed ordering on these stimuli has no intrinsic biological significance to the 
animals, nor any connection to any naturally tr ansitive relationship”. If however, a richer 
(natural) co ntext is giv en that includes true c ausal r elations between the dif ferent stim uli, 
organisms might “simply” extract the im portant regularities on the basis of causal reasoning. 
Apes naturally living in an com plex and changi ng environment, for exam ple, should benefit 
from cognitive m echanisms that go beyond ass ociation form ing and enable th em to take 
advantage of the richness of m eaningful object–object relations in their environment (Call & 
Tomasello, 2005; Tom asello & Ca ll, 1997). In that view, inhe rited predispositions, fixed 
learning patterns, and flexible r easoning could interact  very effectively w ithin one cognitive 
system. If we accept that claim, associative learning loses its exclusive hegemony of being the 
most parsim onious and therefore preferable explanation. Depending on the context, causal 
reasoning and conditioned res ponses can be tw o coequal components of a com plex cognitive 
toolbox, each of which is used for individual purposes.    
 
 
Unique human causal cognition? 
 
Historically, the topic of hu man uniqueness within the anim al kingdom  has always been 
prominent and underwent a special scientific renaissance in the la st century with the 
emergence of the fields of com parative psychology and  cognitiv e ethology. T he entire 
question of  uniqueness would be superfluous if we accepted Rene Descartes’ claim  of 
sophisticated immaterial human minds opposed to animals as physiologically driven machines 
(Descartes, 1637/1997). Charles D arwin and ot her com batants, however, challenged that 
presumption of hum an hegemony by claim ing that  evolution takes plac e gradually, with the 
same principles applying for all living be ings, including our ow n species (Darwin, 
1859/1998). If we follow his basic claim  conse quently, we should expect that cognitive 
abilities—like any physiological feature—must develop from simpler to more complex forms, 
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and that th is progressio n should be scientifically traceab le. Depending on the focus of 
research, many differences between hum ans and nonhum an m inds are very likely to be 
detected, bu t scientists should not expect “ unbridgeable g ulfs in cog nition” (Pap ineau & 
Heyes, 2006).  
Nevertheless, given the comm onalities between ape and hum an cognition, it seem s obvious 
that adult hum ans exhibit a form  of causal an alyses that goes beyond that of nonlinguistic 
beings. Most obviously, only (adult) hum ans explicitly use laws of physics or psych ological 
theories to describe the underlyi ng causal structure of object re lations or human interactions, 
respectively. But which aspect (s) facilitates such  cognitive singularity and m akes hum an 
causal attributions so different? Seed and Call (2009) suggested a useful framework of causal 
knowledge in which three representational le vels of object properties are specified—
perceptual, structural, and symbolic knowledge. On the lowest level, purely perceptual 
information is encoded , which m eans that arb itrary and c ausal r elations are in p rinciple 
represented the same way. Correct p redictions concerning new events are lim ited to contexts 
that share sim ilar perceptual features with already known regul arities. Perceptual knowledge 
could be described as based on first-order re presentations described by Mandler (2004). On 
the next cog nitive level, structural in formation can be extracted from  the perceptual input so  
that specific infor mation about functional pr operties of objects can be possessed by the 
system. Importantly, such structural knowledge is abstract and multimodal, which allows it to 
be generalized to new situations that do not necessarily share perceptual features with familiar 
contexts. According to som e scientists, ape cau sal cognition does not reach that level and is 
instead solely based on perceptual factors—th e first level of analyses (Penn, Holyoak, & 
Povinelli, 2008; Penn & Povi nelli, 2007; Povinelli, 2000) . The so -called unobservabilty 
hypothesis, for exa mple, im plies that hum ans a lone are capable of r easoning about entities 
that are not directly percei vable, such as causal forces  (Povinelli & Vonk, 2003, 2004; Vonk 
& Povinelli, 2006).  I disagree with that claim  and argue in  accordance with Seed and Call 
(2009) that chimpanzees are capable of possess ing unobservable information in order to form  
structural knowledge about a situation. This a ssumption is supported by the current data, in 
which the use of perceptual knowledge alone is  insufficient to explain the dem onstrated 
performances, especially those of STUDIES II  and III. Other researchers h ave reached similar 
conclusions for other species by using comp letely different experim ental paradigm s 
(Blaisdell, et al., 2006; Leising, et al., 2008; Waldmann, et al., 2006).  
Returning to the fram ework of Seed and Call (2009), the third lev el o f causal cog nition is  
characterized by abstract sym bolic represen tation. Sim ilar to perceptual knowledge, such 
symbolic knowledge also consists of an arbitrary relation between the cue and its referent, but 
this time on an abstract conceptual level. T hus, symbolic knowledge does not reflect the lack 
of structural knowledge (as perc eptual processing does); rather , it requires the individual to 
ignore the structural inform ation by going beyond the given func tional or causal content. For 
example, a “do not cross" sign does not need to physically b lock access but simply refers to a 
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real barrier instead. Such abst ract, arbitrary  concepts are co mpletely amodal and en able the 
individual to generalize across a nearly infinite number of stimuli and contexts.  
The current findings cannot directly prove or disprove whether apes can handle sym bolic 
knowledge or whether they represen t real concepts of causality (Carey, 2 009); it also remains 
open to which degree they take into account logical distinctions between the necessity and the 
sufficiency of a cause (Mackie, 1980). However, following Seed and Call (2009), this is 
where I would expect to find the m ain difference between hum an and nonhuman causal 
cognition. I speculate that the em ergence of verbal communication in  humans provides the 
cognitive fundam ent that enables us to operate  with concepts of cau sality on an abstract 
symbolic level that goes be yond that of any other anim al species. The underlying fram ework 
for such a cognitive step m ight be the ac cumulative character of  our hum an culture 
(Tomasello, 1999). 
 
 
Final conclusion and outlook 
 
The results of the current thes is add to a grow ing body of rese arch indicating that not only 
humans but also other anim als possess basic fo rms of causal knowledge. I believe that these 
results present convincing evidence for the assumption that great apes—in this case, 
chimpanzees—are able to reason causally on a level that cannot be explained by an y of the 
existing models of associative theory or trial-and-error learning. Subjects seemed to recognize 
that specific physical properties of objects determine how these interact with their 
environment. Noticeably, the tested subjects went beyond mere perceptual feature processing 
and instead appreciated the underl ying causal structure of the gi ven problems. Such abstract 
structural representation of object properties en ables chimpanzees to generalize very flexibly 
and to predict certain outcom es that would be  unpredictable on the basi s of purely perceptual 
features (Seed & Call, 2009).  
The current data will also hopefully assuage the skepticism of Kummer (1995), who, 14 years 
ago, denied the exis tence of any compelling ex amples of strong causal knowledge and causal 
reasoning in nonhuman primates. 
Future studies will shed further light on the na ture of causal cognition. Creativity and  caution 
is required when developing experimental designs to ensure a fair and appropriate comparison 
between subjects of different species. I am  convinced that the best way to disentangle issues 
of causal understanding is by approaching the topic from different scientific angles. As is true 
for many, if not all, complex research questio ns, the final answer wi ll not be given by one 
single experiment but by a fruitful interplay of several empirical and observational paradigms. 
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Epilogue 
 
Having begun with David Hum e’s seemingly optimistic quotation about nonhum an minds, I 
would like to finish this thesis with a further passage of his from the same text. Here he added 
a remark about the explicit limits of animal cognitive abilities:  
“Beasts certainly never perceive any real  connexion among objects. ' Tis therefore by 
experience they infer one from  another. They  can never by any argum ents for m a general 
conclusion, that those objects, of which they have no experience, resemble those of which 
they have. ' Tis therefore by m eans of cust om alone, that experience operates upon them ” 
(Hume, 1739/1986). 
In ligh t of  all th e new data availa ble, I am  optim istic th at Hum e the em piricist would  
reconsider his claim today.  
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